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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effects and policy lessons from the surge of capital 
inflows that the Baltic countries experienced during the period 2004-2008. We 
discuss the main risks and policy challenges involved with such an episode and 
assess what scope there was for policy makers to face these challenges. We also 
devote some attention to the area of measuring exchange rate pressure by 
application of the EMP index. Our main findings are that the Baltic countries were 
very limited in their policy options due to their lack of an independent monetary 
policy. Furthermore it seems as if it would have been very hard for them to take 
sufficient precautionary measures in time to avoid a deep recession following the 
global financial crisis, as this extreme event had a large impact all around the world. 
There was however some scope for better policies within the management of 
government finances and financial regulation. Regarding the measurement of 
exchange rate pressure we find that a new approach suggested by Klaassen & Jager 
(2011) seems to be valid from both an intuitive and practical perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
At the regain of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 the Baltic countries 
commenced a substantial transition moving from a system of central planning towards market 
economies. After some turbulent years, especially during the Russian crisis in 1998, the 
countries entered a prosperous path of stable and rapid convergence towards Western Europe. 
By 2004 all three countries had been granted membership in both the EU and NATO. During the 
following years growth increased even further as large levels of capital started to flow into the 
Baltic economies, mostly directed to the growing banking sector, and credit expanded extremely 
fast, to a large extent denominated in foreign currency. The easy access to credit boosted 
domestic demand, asset prices surged and GDP growth picked up further momentum. This 
development was however also accompanied by rising inflation which deteriorated 
competitiveness since all three countries were operating fixed exchange rate regimes. By 2007 
the Baltic economies were overheated, and concerns regarding their future stability arose as 
they entered recessions. It was during this very fragile period that the global financial crisis 
emerged.  
 
The Baltics suffered a dramatic bust and were to be the most severely affected region in the 
world as their economies contracted by some 20-25 percent from their peak levels. During the 
crisis credit markets dried up causing severe illiquidity problems, unemployment rose sharply 
and demand plummeted. Furthermore, Latvia was target of a serious speculative attack on its 
currency the Lats and both the Estonian Kroon and Lithuanian Litas came under severe 
pressure. Yet all three countries managed to maintain their pegs and an outright banking crisis 
was avoided through emergency lending from IMF, Nordic central banks and financing of foreign 
parent banks. Despite the devastating experience Estonia became a full member of the EMU in 
January 2011, while Latvia and Lithuania are still struggling to fully recover. 
 
It is in the light of these extraordinary series of events that our study will attempt to give a 
more detailed understanding of the Baltic experience. We do this by initially reviewing some 
theoretical and empirical findings of the mixed blessing of large capital inflows. We also look in 
more detail at the potential implications of such periods on the receiving countries stability and 
crisis propensity, and investigate the policy toolkit available in dealing with such episodes. We 
then give an in-depth description of the boom-bust cycle in the Baltics where we devote 
significant attention to explore the means of measuring exchange rate pressure under fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Finally we evaluate what scope there was for the Baltic countries to 
avoid the devastating outcome by better policies. 
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1.1 Purpose 
The overall purpose of this study is to investigate the risks associated with large capital 
inflows to emerging economies, in particular those operating fixed exchange rate regimes, and 
the policy options available when dealing with such inflows. The experience of the Baltic 
countries during the period 1998-2010 makes out a very good reference situation for this 
purpose and might give valuable policy lessons for other European countries entering the 
ERMII1 with the ambition of eventually becoming full members of the EMU. There is hence need 
for an examination of available policy options and an assessment of the Baltic performance 
within this area. Since the EU prohibits obstacles to free capital movement and compliance of the 
Maastricht criteria2 restricts larger currency fluctuation in the period before EMU accession, 
there might be very limited scope for stabilizing policies and it could be crucial that the few 
policy measures available are used efficiently. Finally, in order to gain in-depth knowledge of the 
Baltic countries’ exchange rate regimes and the pressure put on them during the period we 
investigate the construction and application of an exchange market pressure (EMP) index, which 
to our best knowledge is the most frequently used measure for this purpose.  
 
1.2 Method 
To address our overall purpose with this study we use the most relevant parts of the vast 
literature of causes, risks and prevention of financial and currency crises. We pay special 
attention to two IMF Staff Position Notes from 2010 and 2011 respectively (authored by Ostry et 
al.) when investigating policy options in response to large capital inflows as these give a very 
structured and comprehensive treatment of the issue. We do however also discuss other 
authors’ opinions on the topic. In order to obtain a complete set of relevant data, several 
different databases have been used. For the sake of consistency we have tried to rely primarily 
on the IMF database International Financial Statistics (IFS). There have however been numerous 
gaps and to fill these we have turned mainly to the databases of national central banks, Eurostat 
and BIS statistics. 
 
In order to gain a detailed picture of the evolution of the three countries’ exchange rates we 
employ a version of the Exchange Market Pressure index initially introduced by Girton & Roper 
(1977), and later revised by several different authors. Due to the rather large inconsistency 
between authors in the application of the index, we have put considerable time and attention in 
order to find the most appropriate application for our study. Our choice have been to follow the 
approach outlined by Klaassen & Jager (2011), as we find this to be the most intuitive and they 
convincingly show the advantages of it. In order to evaluate the robustness of this EMP measure, 
which has not been evaluated to any further extent, we will also present and examine three 
alternative and more established measures in accordance with previous research. All data for 
our EMP estimations are gathered from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
  
                                                             
1 European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
2 The Maastricht criteria are the rules governing full EMU membership. 
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1.3 Delimitations 
During the global financial crisis there were several different country experiences of interest 
for our study within Central and Eastern Europe. However covering them all in detail would 
pose a far too extensive task for the scope of our study. We have therefore chosen to focus 
primarily on the Baltic countries since these were among the most affected countries and are 
easily compared with each other as they are very similar in terms of size, location and 
development over time. Since investigating financial sector regulation in detail would require a 
study of its own we confine ourselves with a slightly more general approach, leaving aside 
specific national and cross country legal issues. Our focus hence lies within the macroeconomic 
and financial sector stability and overall regulation rather than specific supervision and 
regulation on the individual bank level. 
 
When investigating Exchange Market Pressure we would have liked to use daily data over 
the respective central banks operation but due to data limitations we have to confine ourselves 
to monthly observations. This is naturally a rather serious limitation if one wants to gain in-
depth knowledge of the events of a particular speculative attack, since there can be drastic 
changes in very short periods of time. However our study is more interested in the development 
of the full boom-bust cycle and for this purpose we do not find the constraint of monthly data to 
be a decisive drawback. In fact Klaassen & Jager (2011) show that even though some 
information is lost monthly data is sufficient to obtain sufficient information of the overall 
development. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews some theoretical and 
empirical findings related to capital inflows, where the determinants and characteristics of 
capital inflows are explained initially and the risks and policy responses are outlined after. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the Baltic development leading up to, and during the global 
financial crisis. We pay particular interest to the rapid credit expansion that took place. In 
chapter 4 we outline the theory behind EMP, construct and estimate our own measure and 
finally discuss our results. In Chapter 5 we evaluate the policies available in response to the 
large capital inflows and discuss the room for different policies. Finally we present our main 
conclusions in chapter 6.  
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2. Capital inflows to emerging economies: the lurking crisis 
There is little doubt about the welfare improving potential of free capital movements within 
the theoretical economic literature. Global financial markets allow agents to allocate capital 
where it is most efficiently used, thereby achieving higher yields. Capital inflows from developed 
to developing countries can help finance investments and stimulate economic growth by 
accumulating capital of physical, financial and human form. However capital inflow surges are 
no unambiguous blessing.  Many of the recent currency crises in emerging markets have been 
preceded by periods of large inflows of foreign capital which eventually come to a sudden stop 
or a sharp reversal, leading to severe recessions and often full blown currency and financial 
crises (Reinhart et al. 1996).  
 
It is important to distinguish between different types of capital flows in order to understand 
the underlying determinants and different characteristics of them. For example it seems as if 
larger amounts of short-term debt increase both the likelihood and the severity of a crisis 
(Rodrik & Velasco 1999). In order to get a better understanding of the nature of international 
capital flows this section investigates the main drivers of international capital movements as 
well as the vulnerabilities that might arise in less developed markets during periods of large 
inflows. 
2.1 Capital inflows: determinants, characteristics and risks 
Over the last decades capital flows have been very volatile and looking especially at 
emerging countries there have been major changes over time. During the period between the 
late 1970s and early 1980s there were large capital inflows to emerging markets. With the Latin 
American debt crisis starting in 1982 these inflows however came to an abrupt halt and many 
Latin American economies entered severe recessions (Reinhart et al. 1994). During the early 
1990’s capital flows to the emerging market economies started again and increased dramatically 
over the 1986-1996 period (nominally about 11 times). However, new sudden stops occurred 
e.g. in 1997 when the Asian financial crisis created severe turmoil in the global capital market. 
This time the stops in capital flows were however more temporary and the inflow of capital to 
emerging economies resumed soon after (Carlson & Hernandez 2002). 
 
Along with the change in the size of the flows throughout the 1990s, were also changes in the 
direction, composition and source of capital flows. There are many explanations to what has 
driven these changes. Some authors suggest changes in interest rates and growth in the 
developed world, others point at country specific factors in the receiving countries such as 
political stability, creditworthiness and location while yet others point out macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as GDP growth and interest rate differentials (Carlson & Hernandez 2002). 
Following the many observed financial and currency crises in the 1990’s, triggered mainly by 
sudden stops or even reversals of the capital flows, a lot of attention was also given to the 
composition of capital flows as a determinant of whether the large capital inflows were 
beneficial or detrimental for emerging economies.  
 
In the following section we first give a brief overview over the literature surrounding the 
main determinants of capital flows to emerging economies. We make a distinction between 
whether the changes in capital inflows are caused by conditions in the recipient economies 
(internal pull factors) or conditions in the investing countries (external push factors) in 
accordance with BIS (2009). Thereafter we take a look at the composition and characteristics of 
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short-term (short-term loans and portfolio flows) and long-term (FDI and long-term loans) 
capital flows. Lastly we briefly investigate the process of sudden stops and capital flow reversals. 
Internal (pull) factors  
As with any investments, international capital flows are driven by the search for high yields 
in relation to perceived risk. Domestic policies are central for what the perceived risk of a 
country is and work through several channels. A stable macroeconomic environment, with 
stable price development and sound fiscal policy, reduce the perceived risk and thereby create 
positive signals to international investors (Reinhart et al. 1994). Fernandez-Arias & Montiel 
(1995) examine determinants of the size of capital inflows to developing countries and find that 
the creditworthiness of a specific country is important in explaining both the timing and 
destination of capital inflows. The actions of a country or its government can therefore be of 
great importance as an increased credit rating might trigger large inflows of capital. Institutional 
and structural reforms such as liberalized capital markets are other examples of policies which 
might act as a positive signal of reduced risk as the impact of political uncertainty is reduced 
(Fernandez-Arias & Montiel 1995). Other policies that might induce capital inflows are tax 
credits, tax reductions or other measures that have a direct impact on the expected return of 
investments (Reinhart et al. 1994).  
 
Besides policies there are other country specific factors that might have an impact on the 
size and composition of capital inflows such as endowment of natural resources or rapid 
productivity increases. Reinhart et al. (1996) found an interesting result suggesting that small 
countries can experience increasing capital inflows if they are situated in close proximity to 
larger countries receiving large capital inflows. There might thus be country specific or regional 
factors affecting capital flows which are outside a particular country’s control. This result could 
also be interpreted as an indication of herding behaviour among international investors.  
External (push) factors  
It appears not to be sufficient to explain all capital inflows as a result of internal factors. 
Returning again to the Latin American example, as examined by Reinhart et al. (1992), there 
were countries that did not reform their systems but still received large inflows of capital. There 
were also countries that performed liberalizing reforms that did not see increased inflows. This 
makes external factors as part of the explanation likely, at least for that region and period. 
Excessive liquidity in the global markets is generally considered to be one important factor 
behind external capital inflows to emerging markets. Two measures which are believed to have 
a large impact on global liquidity are interest rates and money growth in developed countries 
(BIS 2009). 
 
Interest rates in developed countries are likely to have an impact on capital flows to 
emerging markets thru three main channels. First, lower interest rates in developed countries 
are likely to increase capital inflows to the emerging markets. This is explained by the fact that 
investors are likely to search for investments offering higher yields which could be achieved 
through investing in emerging economies. This market condition is especially likely to attract 
investors with shorter investment horizons looking to take short-term advantage of the interest 
rate differential. Second, emerging countries are generally net debtors. Lower interest rates in 
net lender countries might thus increase emerging countries credit worthiness as their debt 
servicing costs are likely to be reduced. Finally, lower interest rates in the developed world can 
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induce borrowers in emerging countries to borrow in foreign currency instead of their own and 
hence pay lower yields on their loans (BIS 2009). 
 
Money growth and the general business cycle in developed countries are also likely to have 
an impact on capital inflows although the effects are somewhat ambiguous. If developed 
countries are experiencing a recession it might induce investors to invest in the emerging 
markets in order to take advantage of investment opportunities and better market conditions. 
This relationship was found by Reinhart et al. (1992) for the Latin American region and by 
Reinhart et al. (1996) for emerging economies in both Latin America and Asia. As recessions in 
developed countries increase capital inflows to emerging markets, capital inflows move in the 
opposite direction of business cycles. However, the importance of the relationship seems to be 
weaker during periods where economic conditions in developed countries are improving 
(Reinhart et al. 1996).  
 
One final external contributor worth mentioning is the fact that global investors are 
increasing portfolio diversification. Pension funds and insurance companies in the Euro Area, 
US, UK and Japan have recently been investing to a further extent in emerging markets in order 
to obtain diversification, partly because the financial markets in general are becoming more 
integrated (Reinhart et al. 1996).3 
 
With the main findings of determinants of capital flows in mind we now turn to investigate 
the characteristics of the different types of capital inflows. We divide these into two main 
categories based on their investment horizon and volatility, short-term flows and long-term 
flows. Generally short-term assets can be withdrawn or mature in 12 months or less while long 
term assets have longer maturities. 
Short-term flows 
There are some studies showing that a large amount of short-term external debt is likely to 
increase both the likelihood and the severity of a crisis. Long-term external debt can instead be 
thought of as being associated with accumulation of capital.4 As some types of capital inflows are 
considered to be more reversible depending on their maturity we choose to make a distinction 
between short-term and long-term flows in accordance with Sula et al. (2006).5 Within short-
term flows we make a distinction between portfolio flows and short-term loans while long-term 
flows are divided into foreign direct investments (FDI) and long-term loans. 
 
The general result of previous work looking at short-term flows is that these flows are 
mainly driven by market forces which are characteristic for the state of the economy in the 
country subject to the flows (Carlson & Hernandez 2002). Portfolio flows are important to look 
at because they are one of the main contributors of capital inflows to emerging countries. Bond 
flows, one version of portfolio flows, have been found to be largely affected by secondary market 
prices and credit ratings. This is intuitive because secondary market prices and the secondary 
                                                             
3 See also BIS (2009) 
4 Capital in this sense can be in the form of either physical capital or human capital (which can encourage 
economic development), Frankel & Rose (1996). 
5 Sula et al. (2006) do not have the distinction between short-, and long-term loans but we consider the 
distinction between them to make things more clear. Hegerty (2009) makes a similar distinction although 
he separates capital inflows into FDI and non-FDI where non-FDI consists of portfolio investments and 
other investments (mainly short-, and long-term loans). 
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market in general are important for the possibility of trading bonds. The credit rating of a 
country is also important as this determines the yield on bonds and the risk associated with the 
bonds in the country. Equity flows, another version of portfolio flows, tend to be more sensitive 
to interest rates, price-earnings ratios and rates of return on domestic stock markets (Chuhan et 
al. 1998). Again this is intuitive because with changes in interest rates the relative attractiveness 
of equities changes. When the interest rate increases, the relative attractiveness of the 
alternative investment i.e. equity, decreases. Price-earnings ratios and rates of return on the 
domestic stock market also affect the incentive for investing in foreign markets. Portfolio flows 
are highly liquid assets and can be sensitive to herd behaviour and information problems. As a 
result these investments can easily and quickly be withdrawn at signs of problems in markets or 
economies. 
 
The intuition behind short-term loans is in many ways similar to that of portfolio flows. As 
they have shorter maturity than long-term loans they are easier to “withdraw” from a country by 
not renewing the loan upon maturity. If there are excessive amounts of short-term loans this 
might be an indication, or at least a perception in the market, of an oncoming crisis and this can 
also increase the severity of a potential crisis (Calvo 1998). 
  
In summary the determinants of short-term flows are the same as the determinants for FDI, 
but with the opposite impact (Carlson & Hernandez 2002). One issue of importance relating to 
short-term loans is how these are in turn financed by the lenders, most often banks. If domestic 
banks finance their lending by borrowing e.g. short-term in foreign currency it can create 
mismatches in both currency and maturities.6 
Long-term flows 
Foreign Direct Investments, FDIs, are generally considered to be the most stable version of 
capital inflows. FDIs mainly consist of fixed assets and are therefore quite illiquid and more 
difficult to sell in the emergence of a crisis (Sula et al 2006). By the same logic they are also less 
likely to contribute to a crisis and are generally made with a longer investment horizon. High 
levels of capital transaction restrictions and less developed financial markets have actually been 
found to increase FDI (Montiel & Reinhart 1999, Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias 2000). If there 
are more restrictions on the opportunity of placing capital in a country or if the less developed 
financial market makes it more difficult, FDI is an alternative way of placing capital. For 
domestic firms one way of finding financing, yet avoiding restrictive capital markets, is to allow 
foreign investors to purchase shares of their company, thus increasing FDI. The impact that FDI 
have on a country and its economy is generally more long-term than e.g. portfolio inflows and 
the investment decision is made to a larger extent with focus on the fundamentals of a country 
than on speculative interests. Rather than being associated with increased consumption it is 
assumed to increase domestic capital formation (BIS 2009).  
 
Although generally considered as the most stable component of capital inflows there are 
objections regarding how stable FDIs actually are as there are other flows and activities that can 
be associated with them. Even though capital inflows might enter a country as FDI, they can flow 
out from a country through different accounts (Sula et al. 2006). FDIs can be used by creating 
physical assets such as buildings and factories which are subsequently used as security to obtain 
loans, where the funding from the loan is placed abroad (Bird & Rajan 2002). In this sense FDI 
                                                             
6 A further discussion regarding such mismatches is given in section 2.2. 
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could foster short-term effects in a similar manner as short-term debt. Furthermore, all equity 
investments above 10 percent of total company value are considered FDI according to IMF 
classification. If such equity investments are made in the financial sector and used to finance 
short-term lending, the FDI inflow effectively has the same properties as short-term loans (Sula 
et al. 2006) 
 
Long-term loans are obviously less reversible than short-term loans as there are costs 
associated with redemption. They are often used to finance projects of longer term and are 
therefore less vulnerable to higher interest rates or changed perception of risks (BIS 2009). In 
this sense they provide a quite stable version of capital inflows although still less stable than FDI.    
Sudden stops and reversals of capital flows 
Sudden reversals of capital flows have often been mentioned in the literature as sudden 
stops. A theoretical treatment of the phenomenon is given in Calvo (1998). In short a sudden 
stop occurs as access to financing through international capital markets is lost and repayment of 
short-term loans is demanded by external lenders. If the receiving country has become 
dependent on capital inflows this loss of financing is likely to have a large effect on the recipient 
country’s operational liquidity. The resulting illiquidity reduces aggregate demand which, given 
sticky prices, brings about a fall in output and employment thus triggering a recession. The crisis 
could be further deepened by financial weaknesses arising from borrower’s inability to repay 
their debts as a result of lower incomes or complete insolvency if asset prices decrease sharply. 
As non-performing loans increase, banks become more cautious and cut their loans which 
further aggravate the declining demand. In worst case banks might even turn insolvent and need 
rescue from governments that might not be able to finance such rescues (Calvo & Reinhart 
2000). 
 
Sudden stops are no rare phenomenon. Cardarelli et al. (2009) find that more than one third 
of episodes of large capital inflows end with a sudden stop or full blown currency crisis. The 
vulnerability of a country to a sudden stop should to some part depend on the amount of short-
term debt that needs to be rolled over. This is also the conclusion of Rodrik & Velasco (1999) 
who examined a set of emerging countries during the 1990’s. They found that large amounts of 
short-term external debt in relation to reserves affected both the likelihood and severity of a 
crisis. Their result is however not confirmed by Frankel & Rose (1996) who studied a different 
set of countries over an earlier time period. A possible explanation is that the latter authors used 
short-term debt in relation to GDP instead of reserves. 
2.2 Capital inflows – risks and policy responses 
It has become apparent during the last decades that capital flows to emerging markets often 
are accompanied by periods of widespread turmoil as the capital flows reverse and currency and 
financial crisis emerge. This section discusses these effects of capital movements and what scope 
there is for policymakers to manage episodes of large capital inflows.  
Implications and policy responses 
An increasing inflow of foreign capital can come as a blessing to emerging economies 
previously not able to finance temporary deficits while trying to improve their economic 
performance. Large capital inflows have generally been associated with increasing GDP growth 
thus spurring the economic development of the receiving country. However there is a downside 
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to this development. Large capital flows have also come to be associated with risks of 
overheating, substantial current account deficits, real exchange rate appreciations, creation of 
asset price bubbles, excessive expansions of domestic credit and as the receiving economies get 
dependent of large capital inflows they become increasingly vulnerable to a reversal of these 
flows potentially resulting in a currency crisis (Cardarelli et al. 2009).  
 
Following the recent financial crisis the view of rational investors and blessing of free capital 
movements have been reconsidered. As a result the use of capital controls and other prudential 
policies have gained renewed support even from the IMF, illustrated by two papers (Ostry et al. 
2010 and Ostry et al. 2011) discussing the role of such policies as a complement to 
macroeconomic policies in managing massive capital inflows. There are two main areas of 
concern that can be identified following massive capital inflows; macroeconomic implications 
and financial fragility. The macroeconomic concerns are related to exchange rate appreciation, 
following increased demand for the domestic currency, which may lead to a loss of 
competitiveness in the tradables sector, growing external imbalances and likely large (although 
hard to measure) adjustment cost following exchange rate volatility. There is also substantial 
risk of overheating and high inflation following rapid demand growth driven by increased access 
to credit. As foreign investments increase there are also several concerns with the financial 
stability. Quickly rising asset prices may create bubbles which could be further fuelled by credit 
booms. Rapidly expanding lending could pose a severe risk by itself, especially if credit is 
denominated in foreign currency and given to un-hedged borrowers (like households) who 
underestimate the currency risk. Such financial fragilities are especially pronounced when 
inflows are of a short-run nature (Ostry et al. 2010).  
 
In an IMF paper from 2010 Ostry et al. put forward a neat flow chart guiding the policy 
response to a surge in capital inflows. It gives a very comprehensible view of the policy options 
available and what factors one must take into account when considering what policies to 
implement in response to the macroeconomic and financial concerns. We will use this flow chart 
as a framework when discussing the different policy options available in general and then apply 
it to the Baltic countries in the next section where we examine what policy options that were 
available to them during their episode of capital inflows. 
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Source: Ostry et al. 2010 p. 7 
  
Figure 1 - Flow chart of policy responses to capital inflow surges 
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Exchange rate policy 
The first consideration is exchange rate policy and the fear of excessive exchange rate 
appreciation. There are several ways of dealing with appreciation pressure and the available 
options depend on the exchange rate regime. Ostry et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of 
carefully assessing the current exchange rate before laying out a strategy to resist an 
appreciation, and that such an assessment should be based on the expected medium-term 
evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals on a multilateral level.  The thoroughness needed in 
the assessment is motivated by the possibility that large capital flows, if persistent, could have 
an impact on the equilibrium exchange rate. The exchange rate must then be allowed to adjust to 
this new equilibrium level before intervention can be pursued sustainably. It might thus be 
feasible to allow for some appreciation to occur despite its potentially damaging effect on the 
competitiveness of the tradable sector. 
 
As long as the country does not already have a freely floating regime one option to deal with 
appreciation pressure is to allow for more exchange rate flexibility, either by revaluing the 
exchange rate or by increasing the flexibility of it or both at once. Reinhart & Reinhart (1998) 
acknowledge many advantages with such policy actions. Revaluation allows insulation of the 
money supply, domestic credit and the banking system from the inflows and their possible 
reversal. Furthermore nominal appreciation reduces inflationary pressure. Increased flexibility 
could dampen capital inflows through the increased risk perception of investors caused by 
greater exchange rate volatility. Despite these benefits, Reinhart & Reinhart (1998) note that 
exchange rate adjustment has historically been a rather uncommon response to surging capital 
flows. A possible reason for this could be that a high degree of volatility in the exchange rate, as 
could be the result of large fluctuations in capital flows, could impose great (although hard to 
measure) adjustment cost for the economy which makes policy makers less inclined to adopting 
such policies. Cardarelli et al. (2009) point out that during the inflow period of the 1990’s many 
countries (except emerging Asia) actually faced depreciation pressure. This pressure, which was 
due to large current account deficits, was not resisted strongly and many currencies were 
allowed to depreciate. Yet, the authors also note that there was some accumulation of foreign 
reserves during the same period. These contradicting facts suggest, according to the authors, 
that monetary authorities might have intervened during periods of appreciation pressure but 
not against depreciation pressure. The latter period of capital inflows to emerging markets 
(2004-2007) has instead proven to be accompanied by nominal appreciation of several 
emerging countries currencies, although there has been significant resistance by central banks, 
who did accumulate foreign reserves, showing the widespread desire to limit exchange rate 
appreciation among emerging countries (Cardarelli et al. 2009).  
Reserve accumulation and Sterilization 
According to Ostry et al. (2010) excessive appreciation pressure might give the monetary 
authorities a welcome opportunity to accumulate foreign reserves. The reasons for central 
banks to accumulate reserves is to be able to protect the domestic banking sector and credit 
markets in general by acting as a lender of last resort and at the same time have resources to 
resist a currency run (Obstfelt et al. 2008). If inflation is a concern during such accumulation 
Ostry et al. (2010) further suggest that the FX interventions are sterilized. 
 
Unfortunately Ostry et al. (2010) do not give any guidance as to what a desirable level of 
foreign reserves is or how to measure it and we must hence turn to some other theoretical and 
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empirical findings regarding previous crisis periods and the relation between the magnitude of 
the crises and the level of reserves. In an IMF paper from 2006, Jeanne & Rancière present a 
model to determine the optimal level of international reserves. As a general result they find that 
a reserve-to-GDP ratio around 10 percent is adequate for middle income countries. They find 
that the level of reserves proposed by their rather sophisticated model of optimal reserve 
determination is very much in line with the basic rule of thumb known as the Greenspan-
Guidotti rule which suggest a level of reserves equal to gross short-term external debt (Jeanne & 
Rancière 2006). Rodrik & Velasco (1999) investigates in particular the ratio of short-term 
external debt (STED)7 to reserves and find strong support in favour for both that higher levels of 
this ratio is associated with higher probability of a crisis and a greater magnitude of the crisis. 
More specifically, by investigating 32 emerging economies over the period 1988-1998, they find 
that countries with a STED/Reserve ratio value greater than unity were three times more likely 
to experience a crisis and. The main intuition behind the relevance of the STED/Reserve ratio 
has to do with liquidity. During crisis periods debt rollovers might become very difficult and 
borrowers might hence be forced to repay, which creates a rapid drain of foreign reserves. Their 
results are partially consistent with the results of Aizenmann et al. (2010), who find that 
countries with a high level of short-term debt inflows before the 2008-09 crisis experienced 
higher exchange market pressure during the crisis period. 
 
Obstfelt et al. (2008) instead argues that neither short term debt nor trade deficits are 
relevant when assessing reserve adequacy. They argue that reserve drains through debt 
repayments or trade deficit financing are rather slow and hence do not correspond to the panics 
observed during currency crises. Instead they suggest using the ratio of reserves to the size of 
domestic financial liabilities that can potentially be converted into foreign currency, i.e. M2. They 
do however not suggest an appropriate reserve-to-M2 ratio. In order to provide some guidance 
as to what an appropriate ratio might be one can use the authors’ review of the Argentinean 
experience during the Mexican crisis in 1995 where about one-eighth of M2 was exchanged for 
central bank reserves over the space of a few weeks before IMF financing managed to restore 
confidence (Obstfelt et al. 2008).  
 
In order to avoid rising inflation following foreign reserve accumulation, interventions might 
need to be sterilized. However a commonly mentioned paradigm in open economy 
macroeconomics is the “impossible trinity” or “policy trilemma” which states that it is 
impossible to successfully target the exchange rate, have monetary policy autonomy and allow 
full capital mobility at the same time. The usual conclusion of the paradigm is that in a world of 
freely moving capital, countries must choose between exchange rate control and an autonomous 
monetary policy. However, given imperfect capital markets, where different risk premiums are 
assigned to different bonds depending on which country they are issued in, this paradigm may 
not hold. Because of this, many countries have tried to sterilize exchange market interventions 
in attempt to achieve both exchange rate stability and low inflation. The basic outline of the 
policy action is that as monetary authorities accumulate foreign assets in order to defend the 
exchange rate, they decrease their holdings of domestic assets thereby keeping the monetary 
base constant.8 In order to induce private actors to hold the extra domestic assets interest rates 
usually must rise. Furthermore there might be a cost attached to sterilizations as the central 
                                                             
7 Short-term debt is liabilities with a maturity less or equal to one year. 
8 See BIS 2009 for a thorough discussion of the different designs available for sterilized interventions as a 
response to appreciation pressure.  
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bank exchange high-yield domestic assets for low-yield foreign assets. Such costs might make 
sterilization a temporary solution only, which has been observed for many countries during the 
1990’s and early 2000’s (Cardarelli et al. 2009). 
 
Even though sterilization might make intuitive sense, such actions have at times proven to 
be accompanied by unintended effects. A stable short-run exchange rate (through intervention), 
in combination with high domestic interest rates (following the contraction in the domestic 
money market), could actually induce even larger short-term capital inflows as investors are 
attracted by safer (due to exchange rate stability) and higher yields (Reinhart & Reinhart 1998). 
According to Cardarelli et al. (2009) this unintended effect could be the reason why sterilized 
interventions have been shown to be inefficient at reducing real appreciation. Instead, the 
authors suggest that sterilized interventions are associated with higher inflation and that 
countercyclical monetary policy seems to be associated with greater real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
 
BIS (2009) add to the discussion surrounding sterilization as they notice that there might 
not be need to sterilize exchange rate interventions. They point out an example in the experience 
of many Asian economies during the period of 2002-2005, where the countries managed to 
combine an accumulation of foreign reserves with low policy rates without facing high inflation. 
They argue that this situation was due to the substantial excess capacity within these economies 
which, in combination with a growing manufacturing capacity in other countries, kept world 
prices of tradables low. However they also note that inflation eventually started to rise in these 
countries in 2006 which might suggest that escaping the policy dilemma might only be possible 
during shorter periods of negative output gaps. 
Monetary and fiscal policy 
If previously policy options are exhausted another macroeconomic policy option available to 
affect the exchange rate given by Ostry et al. (2010) is lowering interest rates in order to reduce 
the incentives for capital inflows. However, as the authors note surges in capital inflows are 
often associated by inflation pressure which is likely to reduce the attractiveness of this policy 
option. In such a case they suggest a tightening of fiscal policy. 
  
There are two main fiscal policy options in response to capital inflows; reducing public 
expenditures and increasing taxes. The aim of both is reducing aggregate demand but the 
efficiency of them could differ. If public consumption is more tilted towards non-traded goods 
than private consumption, reducing public expenditure is likely a more efficient policy action 
than tax increases for the private sector in relieving real exchange rate pressure. This is since 
reducing public consumption under such circumstances will have a relatively larger impact in 
cooling the overheating economy. Furthermore increasing taxes during periods of heavy capital 
inflows could be off-set by looser private credit which is often associated with periods of capital 
inflows. If this is the case, and particularly if the tax increase is perceived as temporary, the fall 
in disposable income might to a large degree be compensated for by private borrowing. The 
main problem with fiscal policy actions is that they are generally not suitable for short-term and 
fast adjustment since they usually are sensitive political issues. Hence, such policy actions might 
be too slow to implement and because of this they run the risk of becoming pro-cyclical. 
Furthermore public expenditure is generally focused at medium- to long-term objectives such as 
infrastructure improvements or social spending, two things that might be especially important 
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in emerging economies. It might thus be hard to reduce them without also sacrificing long-term 
growth (Reinhart & Reinhart 1998). 
  
The importance of countercyclical fiscal policies in emerging countries during periods of 
large capital inflows is shown in Cardarelli et al (2009). They find that countries with a high 
growth of public expenditures during the inflow period experienced a sharper fall in GDP growth 
in the post-inflow period.9 They also find that such pro-cyclical fiscal policies are associated with 
higher real appreciation. Reinhart & Reinhart (2008) clearly show how prone emerging 
countries have been to treat the temporary good times of large capital inflows as a permanent 
phenomenon inducing them to expand public expenditures during the boom phase. Such policy 
actions acts to further destabilize the economy and causes a need for dramatic fiscal tightening 
once the bust strikes. In Reinhart & Reinhart (1998) the authors reaches similar conclusions and 
emphasize that conservative fiscal policy during the boom phase in combination with careful 
supervision of the financial sector at all times (i.e. not only once problems have emerged) are the 
strongest lessons to be learnt from the crises in the 90’s. This brings us to the next policy area; 
prudential policies and capital controls. 
Prudential policies and capital controls 
While the earlier mentioned policies are implemented mainly out of macroeconomic reasons 
with the objective to reduce the volume of aggregate inflows, prudential policies (and to some 
extent capital controls) are mainly used to address concerns over the financial stability i.e. the 
composition of capital inflows. Prudential policies are intended to strengthen the financial 
sector’s ability to deal with increased risk or to prevent it from incurring excessive risk. 
Examples of such policies are capital requirements, caps on credit growth and limits on banks’ 
open FX position. Capital controls in a broad sense are measures meant to affect cross-border 
movements of capital e.g. taxes on inflows from non-residents or unremunerated reserve 
requirements (URRs) on foreign inflows. Sound prudential policies of non-discriminatory 
character10 have long been an accepted and encouraged measure to ensure financial stability. In 
contrast discriminatory prudential policies and capital controls have by some authors11 been 
seen as distortions to market efficiency and barriers to productive investments, despite some 
support of their effectiveness12, and the use of them has been limited through several 
multilateral agreements (Ostry et al. 2011). 
 
While not being the optimal policy measures for affecting the size of capital inflows, both 
prudential policies and capital controls are likely to at least temporarily have some volume 
effect. They might thus be used for this purpose as a last resort when other policy options are 
exhausted (Ostry et al. 2011). A different approach to meet the size of capital inflows is to 
remove controls on capital outflows thereby decreasing the net inflows. This could be done by 
allowing domestic investors to acquire foreign assets given that there are binding existing 
controls in place. Such a strategy builds on the assumption that liberalizing outflows will not 
have an effect on inflows which is questionable on both theoretical and empirical grounds. It 
actually seems as if lifting restrictions on capital outflows act as a positive signal, attracting even 
more inflows. In addition this policy option builds on the presumption that domestic investors 
                                                             
9 The authors use the term ”hard-landing” to describe such experiences. 
10 i.e. prudential regulation that does not distinguish between foreign and domestic capital. 
11 See e.g. Mishkin (2000) or Summers (2000). 
12 See Magnud, Reinhart & Rogoff (2005) for a comprehensive discussion. 
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have an incentive to shift into foreign assets, which might be unlikely during times of high 
domestic interest rates. As mentioned earlier a likely result of sterilized interventions and other 
policy actions to limit inflation is to keep domestic interest rates above global levels during 
times of large capital inflows (Reinhart & Reinhart 1998). 
 
Ostry et al. (2011) notices that the design of measures often reflects country specific 
institutional constraints rather than differences in the intention of them i.e. to reduce aggregate 
or specific inflows. Within less sophisticated financial markets with limited prudential 
framework, authorities might need to rely primarily on capital controls while prudential policies 
are a good alternative when financial markets work well and the use of capital controls is 
constrained by international agreements. However the authors emphasize the importance of 
exhausting macroeconomic and non-discriminatory prudential policies before turning to capital 
controls or prudential policies directed at certain capital flows. The discriminatory character of 
capital controls has made such measures subject to international regulation through different 
multilateral treaties. For example, EU members are only allowed to impose temporary 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows since such policies are in conflict with the fundamental 
EU principle of free capital movement (Ostry et al. 2011). 
  
When designing prudential policies and capital controls it is important to distinguish 
between flows that are intermediated through domestically regulated financial institutions 
(RFIs)13 and flows that are not. The authors identify three areas that need particular attention in 
the case of RFI-intermediated inflows:  
 
 Excessively risky external liability structure of domestic banks – heavy reliance on short-
term funding to finance long-term loans, like mortgages. 
 Excessively risky bank asset – FX associated credit risk arising from un-hedged ultimate 
borrowers or currency risk from open FX positions.14 
 Bank lending that is amplifying macroeconomic risks – credit boom and/or asset price 
bubbles. 
 
To meet these concerns the authors suggest policy measures like currency-dependent 
liquidity requirements and limits on banks’ external borrowing to address banks’ external 
liability structure. Higher capital requirements on banks FX loans, limits or prohibition of loans 
in FX to borrowers without a natural hedge and tighter limits on open FX position in relation to 
bank capital, could be used to address concerns of bank asset riskiness. In order to slow credit 
growth15 (through higher bank lending rates) and asset price inflation the authors suggest 
prudential policies like counter-cyclical capital requirements, lower loan-to-value ratios or 
higher reserve requirements. 
 
At a first glance it might seem like relying heavily on prudential policies would be the 
obvious choice when attempting to reduce financial risks, after all that is what they are designed 
                                                             
13 Typically banks. 
14 The difference between the two are that FX associated credit risk arise when banks lend in foreign 
currency to borrowers with income in domestic currency while an open FX position arise when banks 
borrow in foreign currency but lend in domestic thus creating a currency mismatch between its own 
income and liabilities. 
15 This objective is usually pursued by raising the policy interest rate but since this could potentially 
encourage even larger capital inflows it might not be a desirable action. 
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to accomplish. However, according to Ostry et al. (2011) there are some potential limitations to 
their efficiency. First, prudential policies rely on effective supervision which might not be 
present in some emerging economies. Second, prudential policies only apply to the domestically 
regulated financial institutions and might hence be intermediated through other channels e.g. 
direct borrowing from foreign banks. A last factor to bear in mind is the potentially unbalanced 
effect prudential policies and capital controls might have on large versus small and medium 
sized companies. Since smaller firms are generally more dependent on bank financing and less 
able to borrow from abroad than larger firms, prudential policies might affect them 
disproportionately. The authors thus argue that capital controls might pose a better alternative 
despite also noticing that some studies have shown that such controls can make access to 
financing more difficult for small and domestic firms. 
 
We now turn to the risks and available policy responses when inflows bypass the regulated 
financial institutions. The particular risks pointed out by Ostry et al. (2011) are: 
 
 Excessively risky external liability structures of the nonfinancial sector – Risk of maturity 
mismatches that arise when short-term borrowing is used to finance long-term 
investments. 
 Excessive currency risk of private actors balance sheets – FX denominated borrowing 
create currency mismatches as income and liabilities of borrowers are of different 
currency. 
 Direct borrowing from abroad create asset price inflation and potential bubbles 
 
As seen these risks are very similar to those aforementioned. The difference lies in the 
potential policy responses. Since capital inflows in this case are not intermediated through 
domestic RFIs, regular prudential policies are not effective. While the authors point out that 
prudential regulation on borrowing of the non-financial sector could be applied in principle, 
they also argue that such policies are likely too slow to implement and too costly to administer. 
Instead they acknowledge the role of capital controls when dealing with such inflows. Possible 
measures include capital controls to discourage debt instruments or FX borrowing by un-hedged 
entities or discriminatory prudential policies to prevent non-financial borrowers from 
borrowing in FX for certain assets e.g. mortgages. 
 
Since the issue of financial regulation has received a lot of attention and been subject to 
widespread debate in the aftermath of the financial crisis we now turn to a more detailed 
discussion regarding the proper design of prudential policies and capital controls and the 
empirical experience of such in the past. 
Designing prudential policies and capital controls 
Before turning to the policy design we briefly review some empirical results regarding the 
effectiveness of them. Cardarelli et al. (2009) note that there are large difficulties involved when 
assessing the effects of capital controls mainly due to selection biases16. When trying to take 
such biases into account they find that the use of capital controls does not seem to be associated 
with lower real appreciation (following smaller net inflows) or softer landings. By examining the 
experience during the 2008-09 crisis Ostry et al. (2011) however find that countries with capital 
                                                             
16 i.e. the empirical problem that capital controls might be more common in countries with weaker 
macroeconomic fundamentals which might give rise to spurious results. 
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controls or prudential measures in place before the crisis displayed greater resilience in GDP 
growth. In particular capital controls and macroeconomic prudential measures seem to be of 
importance as both displays a simultaneous significant effect while FX-related prudential 
measures seem to work as a substitute for capital controls. The authors further find that capital 
controls seem to be associated with reduced FX lending, and external debt but not reduced 
lending booms in general. The same can be observed for FX-related prudential measures. On the 
contrary macro-prudential policies limit banks’ general lending while they do not seem to have 
any effect on FX lending. 
 
We now turn to the design of the policies. Ostry et al. (2011) mentions two objectives to be 
achieved; effectiveness (policies achieve their designated objective and are not easily 
circumvented) and efficiency (policies minimize distortions and scope for non-transparent 
enforcement). The authors argue that capital controls should mainly be used in response to 
temporary surges in capital flows while the exchange rate should be allowed to adjust if inflows 
are of a more persistent nature. Prudential policies can be used whenever there is concern over 
the stability within the financial sector. When targeting the volume of capital inflows (i.e. out of 
exchange rate related concerns), controls need to be applied broadly and when the target is 
instead altering the composition of inflows (risk reduction), a more narrow approach directed at 
certain types, e.g. short-term FX debt, is more appropriate. However the more narrow the 
policies are designed the easier it might be to circumvent them. There is thus need for careful 
consideration before specifying the measures. Circumvention can be accomplished in many 
ways. For example if controls are not imposed on national expatriates’ homebound transactions, 
there is scope for transactions abroad between non-residents and residents, thus channelling 
inflows through the expatriate remittances. Another option is to mask flows as FDIs e.g. through 
equity investments in local subsidiaries which later are transformed to debt (Ostry et al. 2011). 
 
Finally there is the question of quantity- (administrative) vs. price-based (taxes or URRs) 
controls. In support of price-based controls the authors argue that they generate tangible 
revenues for governments and that they might be easier to adjust and administer.17 The authors 
therefore argue that price-based controls are generally to prefer, but the information asymmetry 
involved regarding e.g. the creditworthiness of ultimate borrowers could make quantitative 
measures more appropriate for prudential purposes in the financial sector. 
  
                                                             
17 However it should be noted that the opposite could also be true under uncertainty regarding the private 
sectors response, making price-based controls hard to calibrate. 
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3. The Boom and Bust in the Baltic countries 
When joining the EU in 2004 the Baltic countries seemed to be at a fast and steady 
convergence path towards Western Europe. EU accession also brought with it an expanded room 
for public spending, as the countries were now eligible for EU grants. The prospect of future 
Euro adoption in combination with rapid economic growth raised income expectations and 
attracted foreign capital, giving rise to a rapid credit boom financed mainly by Nordic banks. By 
2007 the economies were overheated and substantial external balances had arisen and when the 
global financial crisis evolved in 2008, the Baltic countries were subject to a severe sudden stop 
in capital inflows as financial institutions attempted to deleverage their exposure to the region. 
In this section we investigate the evolution of the boom phase and the crisis that followed in 
order to acquire a more detailed picture of the course of events. We start off at the time of 
independence from the Soviet Union. 
3.1. Post-Soviet Union period 
At the regain of independence from the Soviet Union 1991 the Baltic countries commenced a 
substantial transition, moving from a system of central planning towards market economies. The 
initial development of the countries’ economies were however not entirely smooth. Following 
the breakdown of the central planning system disruptions in inflation, output and external 
balances arose.  The countries experienced terms-of-trade shocks as prices of Russian energy 
and raw materials reached world market prices at higher levels, causing a deterioration of the 
terms-of-trade of about 20 percent of GDP, which also implied a sharp decline in real income. 
The Baltic countries were in need of economic stabilization and as a measure to achieve this all 
three countries introduced their own currencies in 1992 in an ambition to signal the 
independence from the former Soviet Union as well as enable them to pursue independent 
monetary and fiscal policies (Knöbl & Haas 2003). The reaction to stabilizing policies in 
combination with structural reforms within e.g. taxation resulted in lower inflation and more 
stabilized economies but at the same time output was decreasing. As more liberalizing reforms 
were made throughout the 1990’s the countries experienced lower inflation and higher growth 
combined with current-account deficits. These current-account deficits where to large extent 
financed by foreign direct investments (FDI) and there were signs of overheating in Estonia in 
1997 because of excessive domestic credit expansions. At the outbreak of the Russian crisis in 
1998 the Baltic countries were hit hard. Although independent from the former Soviet Union 
and striving to increase trade with the western economies, large parts of their exports were still 
bound for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS. Trade to these countries 
made up 15-20 percent of total trade in Estonia, 20-30 percent of total trade in Latvia and 25-45 
percent in Lithuania (Knöbl & Haas 2003). Estonia was already in an economic slow-down phase 
and showed signs of overheating, and as the Russian crisis evolved, fiscal deficits in all three 
countries rose. The crisis hit the Baltic countries with different magnitude but the economies of 
all three countries went into recession (Ibid). 
  
Despite the economic stress endured during the transition period, especially prominent 
during the Russian crisis, all three countries maintained their fixed exchange rate regimes 
throughout the period. 18 The fact that the pegs were maintained likely provided the countries’ 
exchange rate regimes with great credibility which according to Darvas (2009) contributed to 
both foreign investors’ and domestic residents’ confidence in the years to come. The economic 
                                                             
18 The details for these fixed exchange rate regimes are explained in section 5.1 
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turbulence created by the Russian crisis ended rather fast and the Baltic countries entered a 
period of fast and stable growth with average growth rates in real GDP of 5-6 percent during the 
1996-2003 period. This development was however associated with growing external imbalances 
as current account deficits as share of GDP reached levels of 12-13 percent in Estonia and Latvia 
and about 8 percent in Lithuania (IMF CR 06-353). During the growth period after the Russian 
crisis all three countries also managed to improve fiscal balances with Estonia running a surplus 
of 1,8 percent of GDP by 2003 and significantly reduced deficits at just over 1 percent for the 
other two countries (EIB 2008). Following this period of positive development the Baltic 
countries were granted membership in both the EU and NATO in 2004. 
 
3.2. The EU membership boom and the slowdown 
By 2004 the global financial environment was characterized by abundant liquidity and low 
risk aversion. Low interest rates in advanced countries led to large capital flows to emerging 
markets, among them the new member states (NMS) of the EU.19 As mentioned earlier the Baltic 
countries had by this time made substantial market oriented reforms and in combination with 
high income growth, prospects of future Euro adoption and a stable fiscal balance they 
composed a very attractive market for financial investments.  
 
The countries had already started to receive large capital inflows before EU accession but 
these increased further during the 2003-2007 period. Cumulative net capital inflows as a share 
of 2003 years GDP over the period amounted to 166 percent in Latvia, 111 percent in Estonia 
and 85 percent in Lithuania. Such rapid capital inflows were experienced in several other 
eastern European NMS, with unweighted average capital inflows of 107 percent of 2003 years 
GDP.20 However the Baltic countries were extreme in many aspects, to some extent together 
with Romania and Bulgaria. In all five countries capital inflows increased substantially more 
than in the other NMS, especially credit to the private sector was expanded at a faster pace, and 
the composition of capital inflows differed substantially between the NMS. Other investments 
(mainly bank lending) composed 75-80 percent of total capital inflows to the Baltic countries 
compared to 20-53 percent in other NMS. The equivalent shares of FDIs were around 25 percent 
for Latvia and Lithuania and 49 percent in Estonia, while portfolio investments were negative 
for all three countries (Bakker & Gulde 2010).21  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 In addition to the Baltic countries the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 
2004 and Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 
20 Almost three times the size of those experienced in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand in the run-up to 
the Asian crisis 
21 It should be noted that capital flows from parent banks to local subsidiaries are partly included in both 
FDI (permanent debt and equity) and other investments (loans and deposits). 
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A great share of the inflowing capital went into the banking sector, as Nordic banks 
channelled investments to local subsidiaries in order to service the increasing demand for 
credit.22 By 2005 all three Baltic countries had joined the ERMII, as a first step to become full 
                                                             
22 Even though the Nordic banks were very dominant in the Baltic region, domestically owned banks in 
Latvia and Lithuania also expanded credit rapidly funded by non-resident deposits and borrowing on 
global markets. However by 2007 the share of foreign banks in the Baltics measured by the value of assets 
was 98,7 percent in Estonia, 91,7 percent in Lithuania and 63,8 percent in Latvia (Alvarez-Plata 2009). 
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members of the EMU.23 As a result they all maintained strict pegs towards the Euro which 
induced FX denominated borrowing and kept interest rates low. The positive outlook for the 
Baltic countries raised income expectations and since credit was given at low real interest rates, 
especially on euro denominated loans, the domestic credit demand increased (Purfield & 
Rosenberg 2010). Darvas (2009) in fact argues that nominal interest rates on euro denominated 
loans were actually below the inflation rate making the effective real interest rates on such loans 
negative. Between 2005 and 2007 credit expanded extremely fast at a rate of about 40-60 
percent annually (Riksrevisionen 2011). By the end of 2008 the share of credit denominated in 
foreign currency was 85,1 percent in Estonia, 88,4 percent in Latvia and 60 percent in Lithuania 
(Alvarez-Plata & Engerer 2009). Such a situation is potentially dangerous as it creates currency 
mismatches in borrowers’ revenues and liabilities.  A potential depreciation (or devaluation) 
under such circumstances could come as a dreadful burden to borrowers, who would become 
much more indebted in relation to their disposable income. A large share of foreign 
denominated debt thus limits authorities’ options of exchange rate realignment in order to 
increase competitiveness (Purfield & Rosenberg 2010).  
 
 
 
With easy access to cheap credit and high 
future income expectations domestic demand 
increased sharply. About half of the domestic 
credit issued in the Baltics went to households, 
mainly in the form of mortgages, which induced a 
rapid increase in real estate prices, most 
prominent in Latvia where nominal real estate 
prices grew by 60 percent per year during 2003-
2007.24 Such price increases created substantial 
wealth effects as house owners asset value 
increased. This further boosted consumption 
which was the largest contributor to GDP growth 
in Latvia and Lithuania (Mitra 2011).  
 
 
The increase in domestic demand induced higher GDP growth, and throughout the years 
2003-2007 the Baltics experienced an annual GDP growth rate of 8-10 percent, higher than that 
for any other NMS (Bakker & Gulde 2010).  
 
 
                                                             
23 A more thorough description of the Baltic exchange rate regimes and the ERMII can be found in section 
5.1 
24 This figure should be taken with some cautiousness as we suspect that it only reflects real estate prices 
in the Latvian capital Riga. 
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However, the increasing demand also led to rising inflation pressure which was further 
fuelled by price level convergence towards price levels in the rest of the euro area, as the Baltics 
pegged their currencies against the euro.25 Similar rising inflationary pressures had previously 
been seen in e.g. Spain and Ireland after they entered the Euro26. In addition, the EU accession 
meant increases in some indirect taxes and custom duties which, in combination with surging 
world energy and food prices, also contributed to raising domestic prices, especially in Latvia 
(IMF CR 05-282).  
 
 
 
As unemployment decreased throughout 
the boom period, to a large extent as a result 
of increased construction, total wage costs 
increased as well. Annual growth rates of 
nominal wages, in both public and private 
sectors, amounted to about 16 percent in 
Estonia and Lithuania and as much as 20 
percent in Latvia during the 2004-2008 period 
(Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). This was partly 
due to expansionary fiscal policies but wage 
increases were also affected by migration to 
Western Europe and shortages of qualified 
labour (Darvas 2009). Even though fiscal 
balance actually improved in the Baltic 
countries over the period, public expenditures 
were likely to loose. During the boom strongly growing revenues, arising both from the 
expanding economy and from access to EU grants, were used to finance expanding public 
expenditures which added further fuel to the consumption boom, thus further fuelling 
                                                             
25 The different pegs that were pursued are explained in section 5.1  
26 The development seen in Spain and Ireland was not as substantial. However they experienced housing 
and construction booms following economic growth with inflation rates above the average in the euro-
area. This was triggered by low interest rates in the euro-area which increased demand leading up to the 
booms (Darvas 2009).    
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overheating (Bakker & Gulde 2010). In Latvia e.g. social benefits rose by 44 percent between 
2006-2008 in real terms and Lithuania and Estonia showed similar developments (Purfield & 
Rosenberg 2010). 
 
The increased consumption following the improved access to credit and higher incomes, 
resulted in very large current account deficits that by 2007, made up 23 percent of the gross 
domestic product in Latvia, 18 percent in Estonia and 15 percent in Lithuania (IMF CR 09-86). 
Only Bulgaria, among the EU-9, had higher current account deficits than the Baltics. It can be 
noted that among the NMS, countries which experienced higher growth in credit to GDP also 
experienced higher inflation, larger current account deficits and higher external debt (Bakker & 
Gulde 2010). The large current account deficits were not only due to consumption well above 
production capacity. The rapidly increased wage levels caused unit labour costs (ULCs) to 
increase and inflation caused the real effective exchange rate to appreciate which both 
deteriorated external competitiveness (Ibid). 
 
Eventually in 2008, prior to the 
global financial crisis, growth started to 
slow down in the Baltic region and 
foreign creditors who recognized the 
slowdown and the vulnerability of the 
wide credit expansion, made efforts to 
decelerate credit expansion to an 
annual 20-25 percent (Riksrevisionen 
2011). The credit rating outlook for the 
region was lowered and the economic 
activity started to decelerate in 2008, 
especially in Estonia and Latvia 
(Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). However 
inflation remained at its higher levels to a large extent because of continued high domestic 
demand and wage growth. This created a gap between GDP growth and inflation which 
implicitly meant that people could afford less consumption. Comparing the three countries we 
see that the gap was much larger for Latvia and lower but still substantial and quite similar for 
Lithuania and Estonia. We also see that Latvia had the lowest level of GDP per capita and at the 
same time had the highest price levels. Worth mentioning here is also that the end to the boom 
and the recognition of the slowdown was made at an earlier stage in Estonia than in Latvia and 
Lithuania. As an example of this, pension and wage increases were granted in Latvia and 
Lithuania as late as in the middle of 2008 which partly explain the remained high price levels 
(Purfield & Rosenberg 2010).  
 
It was during this very vulnerable slowdown phase that the global financial crisis struck, and 
the impact of it to the Baltic countries were to be more severe than in any other region in the 
world as cumulative output declined by 20-25 percent from its peak levels (Ibid). 
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3.3. The global financial crisis 
When the global financial crisis emerged the slowdown turned into a sharp downturn for the 
Baltics. As the crisis evolved financial institutions worldwide started deleveraging their balance 
sheets to reduce risk exposure. Global scepticism of bank soundness led to decreased confidence 
for both foreign owned and domestic banks in the Baltic region. Parex Banka, the second largest 
bank in Latvia and domestically owned, experienced a deposit run and was eventually saved by 
the Latvian government taking over 51 percent initially and 85 percent eventually in 2009 (IMF 
CR 10-356). The Baltics experienced sharp declines in capital inflows, predominantly consisting 
of declines in bank inflows. Annual capital inflows were decreasing by 20 percent of GDP for 
Latvia, 14 percent for Estonia and 12 percent for Lithuania as compared to the boom period 
which was more than most other NMS (Mitra 2011).27 The sudden stop had the most impact in 
Latvia, and as liquidity dried up and speculative pressure arose on the LAT, a EUR 500 million 
swap line between the central banks of Sweden and Denmark on one side and the Bank of Latvia 
on the other side was put in place. The intent behind the swap line was to facilitate protection of 
the Latvian currency reserve until the first payments from IMF and the EU were carried out 
(Ingves 2010). A swap line to Estonia was also granted by the central bank of Sweden, 
Riksbanken, although it was never utilized. In Estonia reserve requirements were high as was 
taxation on dividends, which had encouraged banks to maintain large reserves (Ingves 2010, 
Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). In Lithuania, reserve requirements were decreased from 6 to 4 
percent and the coverage of the deposit insurance was increased. These measures in 
combination with increased liquidity support from parent banks to their subsidiaries to meet 
withdrawals were substantial enough and no swap line was necessary in Lithuania (Purfield & 
Rosenberg 2010). 
  
Confidence in the Baltic economies 
plummeted rapidly as the crisis evolved which 
can be seen from Figure 7 which shows the 
basis spread of a five-year Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS). The large spread on these indicates that 
in order to buy “insurance” against a debt 
default of either government, investors had to 
pay high premiums. The reduced confidence is 
also illustrated by the fact that Latvia received 
the lowest investment grade credit rating 
possible by Fitch and S&P in 2009 which 
reduced confidence for the country’s ability to 
maintain their currency peg (IMF CR 09-3). The 
overall quality in the credit market 
deteriorated sharply and by the end of 2009, 
20 percent of the banking system consisted of 
non-performing loans in Latvia and Lithuania 
while the equivalent share in Estonia was only 
                                                             
27 Bulgaria similarly experienced a large decrease of 17 percent of GDP. 
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6 percent, possibly as a result of stricter risk management (Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). As a 
result of the deteriorated credit quality, supervisors in the three Baltic countries requested 
banks to keep their earnings and foreign banks to tighten provisioning.28  
 
With decreased consumer and investor confidence, governments had a hard time raising 
financing for their expenditure.  Government expenditure was therefore reduced, as can be seen 
in section 5.1, and this further contributed to a contraction of the aggregate demand in the 
region. The credit expansion had been one of the main drivers of domestic demand and asset 
prices and once it came to a halt, both plummeted.  
 
Looking at Figure 25 in the appendix we clearly see that domestic demand started to 
decrease in all three countries around 2007 and continued to decrease until the end of 2009 
when it started to stabilize.29 The decrease was mainly driven by reduced consumption and 
investments, the latter decreased by 65 percent when compared to the peak of investments 
(Bakker & Gulde 2010).  The sharp and sudden, yet short-lived, peak in demand in Lithuania in 
2008 might be due to the fact that GDP was decreasing faster than domestic demand at that 
point.  
 
In addition, increasing unemployment, from 
levels around 4-6 percent in 2008 to levels around 
20 percent in 2010, and decreasing nominal wages 
further reduced domestic demand. The Baltic 
countries performed different labour market reforms 
in order to increase the flexibility and ease the 
impact of being unemployed. Estonia reformed their 
labour law in 2009 by initially reducing lay-off costs 
for employers. A simultaneous increase in 
unemployment benefits was intended but could not 
be accomplished due to fiscal constraints (IMF CR 10-
4). In Latvia measures were taken by increasing the 
duration of unemployment benefits, relaxing the 
criteria for eligibility and introducing a minimum 
floor to benefits (Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). In 
Lithuania, restrictions on flexible employee 
arrangements were removed and lay-off costs were decreased (Ibid).  
 
Furthermore, downward adjustments of wages were performed in response to the global 
crisis. In Latvia the downward adjustment was mainly driven by public sector wage decreases of 
11,5 percent for 2009, while private sector wages only decreased by 1,31 percent. The public 
sector had however also experienced larger wage increases during the boom period and public 
wages was in general higher than in the private sector. In Estonia and Lithuania the 
corresponding adjustments in the public and private sector wages were 4,3 and 4,0 percent in 
Estonia and 2,19 and 6,37 percent in Lithuania (Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). 
                                                             
28 Credit inflows to the NMS countries, except Poland, decreased by 75-110 percent when comparing the 
period after 2007 with the period up to 2008 (Mitra 2011). 
29 In 2009 the decrease in domestic demand was 27,8 percent in Latvia, 24,8 percent in Lithuania and 23,9 
percent in Estonia showing a pace much faster than that for the rest of the EU new member states (Bakker 
& Gulde 2010). 
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The increasing unemployment was accompanied by a sharp decline in production. Between 
2008 and 2009 the cumulative output decreased by 14 percent in Lithuania, 18 percent in 
Estonia and 25 percent in Latvia placing Latvia and Estonia as the two countries in the world 
with the largest decrease in cumulative output followed by Ukraine, Lithuania and Zimbabwe 
(IMF CR 10-201). As the primary trade partners of the Baltics, were also hit hard by the crisis, 
trade was severely reduced as foreign demand decreased and the currencies of the Nordic 
countries and Russia depreciated against the Euro. Since the Baltics were operating currency 
pegs against the euro this further reduced trade with these countries. Hence, the sharp decline in 
output was caused by both internal and external factors. 
 
Beginning in 2006 the current account 
deficits had started to decrease to a large extent 
due to improving trade balances. As mentioned 
earlier exports were decreasing throughout the 
crisis but imports were decreasing to an even 
further extent. In Latvia for example goods 
exports fell by 21 percent in 2009 while imports 
fell by 40 percent leading to an improvement in 
the current account (IMF CR 10-356).  
 
 
 
 
In order to avoid a dramatic deterioration of 
the fiscal balance following the crisis, sizeable 
adjustments were necessary (Purfield & Rosenberg 
2010).  The Latvian government’s hands were tied 
in this respect since payments under the IMF 
Stand-By Agreement (SBA) were conditioned on 
several terms, among them a cap on fiscal deficit of 
5 percent of GDP and a reduction of local 
government wages of 15 percent (IMF CR 09-3). 
Expenditure savings became the principal measure 
for fiscal adjustment accounting for half of the 
adjustment in Latvia and Estonia and three 
quarters in Lithuania. The reason for focusing primarily on reducing expenditure was that the 
level of spending that was reached during the boom was no longer considered adequate. 
Furthermore it was also in line with previous international experience suggesting that fiscal 
adjustment is most successful when driven by spending cuts. The alternative solution would be 
to raise taxes, which was not in line with the general preference of the Baltics to maintain low 
taxation. The main measures taken were: reductions in capital budgets of e.g. education and 
health ministry budgets forcing them to reduce inefficiencies and increase savings, reduced 
government wage bills e.g. by reducing the public sector wage levels, structural reforms in e.g. 
sickness benefits and pensions, and protection of the most vulnerable groups e.g. the 
unemployed (Purfield & Rosenberg 2010). There were also some measures directed at 
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increasing revenues, mainly increases in indirect taxation such as the VAT. In addition increased 
EU grants also generated some revenues (Ibid). 
 
Astonishingly all three Baltic countries managed to endure the global financial crisis without 
devaluation or a full blown banking crisis. Nevertheless the recovery is far from complete and 
the boom years and following recessions have left deep wounds to public finances, 
competitiveness and labour markets which will likely take many years of care to heal. Due to the 
somewhat earlier onset of the recession with following swift policy actions, eligible due to 
accumulation of fiscal reserves during the boom, Estonia managed to escape the crisis with a 
fiscal deficit below the Maastricht ceiling and joined the Euro in January 2011. This indicates 
that prudential policies and strong institutions during a boom can at least to some extent reduce 
the magnitude of a subsequent crisis. It also seems as if Lithuania entered the boom phase 
somewhat later than the other two countries leading to a slightly smaller impact of the crisis. 
This could also be explained by Lithuania’s relatively larger economy which might have been 
more able to absorb the large capital inflows. Latvia was the most affected country and 
monetary authorities had to put up a fierce defence of its currency peg as shown in IMF Country 
Report 09-3 (2009). Interestingly the market share of foreign banks was largest in Estonia and 
smallest in Latvia. As suggested by Purfield & Rosenberg (2010) the relative soundness of 
foreign parent banks might have helped reduce the impact of the crisis as they were able to 
provide strong capital and liquidity support. 
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4. Exchange market pressure 
In order to shed some light on the development of the Baltic countries’ exchange rates, and 
get a better understanding of this development we now turn to the measurement of exchange 
rate pressure. We know that all three countries were operating strict pegs over the period and 
that in particular Latvia was subject to substantial exchange rate pressure during crisis period. 
Still all three countries managed to maintain their fixed exchange rate regimes. We thus need a 
way of capturing exchange rate pressure not only focusing on nominal exchange rate 
movements as this was kept constant. Fortunately, this is not a new problem, and there is 
already a vast literature on an appropriate measurement called exchange market pressure 
(EMP). Once we have created such a measurement we turn to investigate what factors that seem 
to affect it in an attempt to get a better understanding of the development in the Baltics. 
4.1. Methodology 
The EMP index 
The initial measure of exchange market pressure, which captures currency movements and 
ways of avoiding such, was first introduced by Girton & Roper (1977) and later extended by 
Weymark (1997). The EMP of the domestic currency is defined as: 
 
“...the (relative) depreciation required to remove excess supply of domestic currency on the 
foreign exchange market in the absence of policy actions to offset that excess supply.”  
(Klaassen & Jager 2006 p. 2) 
 
A stylized derivation of the commonly used EMP index is given by Klaassen & Jager (2011). 
Let        , denote domestic (base-)money supply, where   is domestic credit created by 
the central bank and    is its holdings of international reserves. Assuming a conventional 
monetary money demand function, money market equilibrium is given by:30 
 
                            (1)  
 
where           ,    is the log price level,    is log real income,    is the interest rate, α is 
the interest semi-elasticity and β is the income elasticity, α and β are both assumed to be 
positive and equal across countries. The same equation is assumed to hold in the foreign 
country. Denoting the log of the nominal spot exchange rate as   (domestic currency price of one 
foreign currency unit) and using asterisks (*) to denote foreign variables, PPP is given by: 
 
        
       (2) 
 
By solving for   and   
  in the money market equilibrium equations and using (2) and 
rearranging, exchange rate equilibrium can be expressed as: 
 
                
         
          
      (3) 
 
                                                             
30 Note that we have omitted the money multiplier from the money supply. This is due to the implicit 
assumption that it is constant and equal across countries. 
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The derivation of EMP continues by taking the first-difference of (3), using linear 
approximation for             and rearranging which yields: 
 
    
   
    
 
   
    
    
           
            
    (4) 
 
EMP is then defined as the left hand side of (4) 
 
          
   
    
     (5) 
 
The intuition behind the measure is that a disturbance in the domestic money market, which 
is assumed to be in initial equilibrium, can be restored through a combination of a currency 
appreciation (depreciation) and/or outflows (inflows) of international reserves i.e. through 
intervention by the central bank. Focusing on the domestic market, if there is excessive domestic 
money demand, so that the money market equilibrium is disturbed, this will require an 
appreciation of the exchange rate or an increase of international reserves held by domestic 
authorities (or both) in order to restore the money market equilibrium. On the contrary an 
excess supply of domestic money will require depreciation and/or outflows from the reserves. 
As the model allows equilibrium to be restored through changes in either the exchange rate or 
the reserves, or both, the model is applicable irrespective of the exchange rate regime (Van 
Poeck et al. 2007). Looking at a flexible exchange rate regime there will be no change in 
international reserves, as the exchange rate will adjust to restore equilibrium. In a fixed 
exchange rate regime the exchange rate cannot change so the international reserves will adjust 
instead. Finally, looking at an intermediate regime, i.e. managed floating exchange rate, the 
equilibrium will be restored through a change in the international reserves, the exchange rate or 
both. Furthermore the EMP index has the advantage of detecting periods of stress that do not 
lead to a devaluation or change of exchange rate regime. If e.g. the authorities manage to 
withstand a speculative attack on their currency by intervention, this episode will still be 
reflected in the EMP index through the change in reserves (Hegerty 2010). 
 
Since the original Girton-Roper formula was presented in 1977 there has been much debate 
regarding the proper specification of the EMP equation. There are two main issues that need to 
be addressed. The first is what components to include and in what form, and the second is what 
weights to assign to the different components. The basic Girton-Roper formula, later modified by 
Weymark (1997), is based on structural theoretical models of exchange rate determination from 
where the specification is derived.31 As a result these specifications are mentioned in the 
literature as model-dependent EMP indexes. However the weak performance of the theoretical 
exchange rate models in estimating short-run currency fluctuations has led the model-
dependent approach to be questioned. 
  
Eichengreen et al. (1994) instead puts forward an alternative model-independent approach 
which has been adapted by several authors.32 The model-independent EMP index looks very 
similar to the original index but has two differences. In order to capture central banks indirect 
ability to affect the exchange rate through the interest rate, the model-independent index also 
                                                             
31 See Weymark (1997) for a comprehensive derivation. 
32 See e.g. Hegerty (2009) and Van Poeck et al (2007) 
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includes interest rate changes as a component.33 This is done by simply adding        
   on 
both sides of Eq. (4).34 The other step away from the model-dependent index is that instead of 
using parameters derived from a monetary model they choose the parameters so that the 
conditional volatility of each component is equal. This is done in order to avoid that the EMP 
index is to heavily driven by changes in reserves which has proven to be far more volatile than 
the changes in exchange rates, which in turn is far more volatile than changes in interest rates 
(Eichengreen et al. 1995 p.36). 
 
Their EMP measure thus is: 
 
                    
     
   
    
,   (5) 
 
Where    and   
  denote the money market rate in home and foreign respectively and    and   
are the weights assigned. 
 
In a recent paper Klaassen & Jager (2011) revisit the way of measuring EMP. The key 
argument is that EMP by definition is the depreciation required to remove excess supply of the 
domestic currency in the counterfactual situation of a passive policy maker i.e. a policy maker 
acting without any concerns regarding the exchange rate. They argue that the previously 
adopted EMP index constructions are not consistent with this definition since they compare 
current policy variables with their lagged values instead of their counterfactual values as 
prescribed by the definition. The counterfactual situation cannot be observed directly but one 
can observe the policy variables that are set to remove pressure. If the counterfactual policy 
variables can be estimated properly, it is hence possible to calculate EMP as the deviation of the 
observed policy variables from the counterfactual ones. By disregarding other objectives of FX 
intervention35 than affecting the exchange rate, the authors set the counterfactual change in 
foreign reserves to zero, making the counterfactual level of reserves equal to     .36 The 
counterfactual interest rate denoted   
 , is to be interpreted as the policy interest rate chosen by 
the domestic monetary authorities in the absence of exchange rate considerations. Since the 
counterfactual interest rate is not observable it needs to be estimated and the authors use a 
generalized Taylor rule to accomplish a theoretical specification of how such estimations can be 
made. For the sake of brevity and since our main interest in the EMP index lies within its 
practical implementation we do not go into any further detail regarding the theoretical aspects 
of the counterfactual interest rate but instead turn our focus on finding a practically useful EMP 
specification.37  
  
                                                             
33 The direct way for central banks to affect the exchange rate is through market interventions i.e. 
increasing or decreasing it’s holdings of foreign reserves. The model-dependent EMP index only accounts 
for this direct channel.  
34 An alternative way would be to move the term          
   to the left hand side. However this would 
complicate the estimation of EMP as the semi-elasticity     would have to estimated first, and would 
interfere with the weight attached to the component. 
35 e.g. accumulation of foreign reserves out of concern of financial stability. 
36 This actually makes the reserve component of the EMP identical to earlier constructions but the 
motivation behind it differs. 
37 Interested readers are referred to Klaassen & Jager 2011 for a thorough theoretical treatment. 
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EMP equation specification 
Before constructing our EMP index we must consider the proper specification for the Baltic 
countries. Two issues need to be addressed. The first is what components to include; the second 
is what weights to assign to the different components. We will start with the issue of component 
selection and specification. 
Components 
The three Baltic countries have maintained a fixed exchange rate regime throughout our 
period of interest. Hence, there should not be much fluctuation in the nominal exchange rate, 
which we confirm by investigating the countries exchange rate against the Euro (ECU before 
Euro adoption). In accordance with Hegerty (2009) we thus choose to omit the exchange rate 
component in our EMP index. This leaves us with two components to specify; changes in 
reserves and interest rates. Bertoli et al. (2010) point out that only part of a central banks 
operation is captured by the change in international reserves. In addition to direct intervention 
on the spot market by selling or accumulating foreign reserves, central banks also have the 
ability to defend its currency by e.g. drawing on stand-by credits from the IMF (which can be 
used for FX intervention or to increase reserves) or performing off-balance sheet operations 
such as interventions on the forward market. These types of interventions will not be captured 
by a gross measure of international reserves.38 Since off-balance sheet operations are generally 
not reported by central banks there is clearly a constraint in data availability regarding such 
operations. However, IMF credits are reported on a monthly basis which allows for the creation 
of a net reserves component which could better capture the actions taken to defend a currency 
(Bertoli et al. 2010). Since such IMF credits have been used in the Baltic countries we will use 
changes in net reserves as a component in our EMP measure. This method is in line with the 
work of Stavarek (2010) who estimates the determinants of EMP in eight eastern European 
countries over the period 1995-2009. Our international reserve component (   ) will thus be 
given by:     
   
    
, where            , is the change in the level of net international 
reserves, and Mt-1 is the monetary base at time t-1.39 
 
The last component of our EMP measure is the interest rate component. Typically the 
interest rate has entered the EMP equation as the difference of money market interest rates 
between the domestic country and a chosen reference country (usually the USA or Germany). As 
with the other components most authors has used this interest rate differential in first 
difference form i.e. as the change in the interest rate differential. Klaassen & Jager (2011) 
however show by an empirical application that this specification fails to fully capture the role of 
interest rates in relieving exchange rate pressure since a onetime increase in the domestic 
interest rate, followed by several periods of significant interest rate gap, will not fully be taken 
into account (i.e.       for all but the first and last period of interest divergence). With their 
interest rate component       
   this problem is circumvented. As discussed earlier the authors 
suggest a theoretical derivation of the counterfactual interest rate    
  . They do however 
acknowledge that this approach has some practical limitations. They hence test some different 
specifications which are easier to use and find that a simple version of the counterfactual rate 
defined as the foreign nominal money market rate (i*) plus the inflation differential (π- π*) is 
                                                             
38 This is since the use of IMF resources to defend a currency on the spot market will not affect the central 
bank’s recorded holdings of foreign assets. 
39 Data sources and definitions are provided in appendix 3 
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sufficient to provide good information on EMP. We chose to follow this approach and our 
interest rate component will thus be:      
  , where    is the domestic money market rate and 
  
    
        
   is used as a proxy for the counterfactual reference rate. As the foreign 
reference country we choose Germany in accordance with other similar studies of Central and 
Eastern European Countries such as Hegerty (2009), Van Poeck et al. (2007), Stavarek & Marek 
(2009) and Stavarek (2010 & 2010b).  
 
Our full EMP index can thus be outlined as follows: 
 
              
            (6) 
 
where       
   is the real interest level differential as defined by Klaassen & Jager (2011), 
    is the change in net foreign reserves in relation to the monetary base. w1 and w2 are the 
(positive) weights assigned to our components which will be explained in the next section. A 
positive EMP value indicates that the domestic currency is experiencing depreciation pressure 
and a negative EMP value that there is appreciation pressure present. The intuition behind the 
signs of the components is that depreciation (appreciation) pressure can be fended off by central 
banks through two channels; by increasing (decreasing) interest rates or by intervening on the 
FOREX market by buying (selling) the domestic currency, thereby decreasing (increasing) the 
amount of foreign reserves. 
Weights 
The last choice to be made is what weights to assign to the different components. Some 
authors like Stavarek (2010) choose to use an unweighted index with the motivation that this 
makes the EMP index easier to interpret. However, in order to avoid that the EMP index is 
dominated by the most volatile component of the equation many authors have proposed a 
variance smoothing approach where each component is weighted by their relative volatility.40 
Some different alternatives to accomplish this are outlined within the existing literature with no 
particular preference for any of them.41 We chose to follow Sachs et al. (1996) and define: 
 
   
 
   
 
    
 
    
      
 
    
 
    
 
    
, 
 
where σr is the standard deviation of the interest differential series and σIR is the standard 
deviation of the series of changes in foreign reserves. 
 
To our knowledge the level real interest rate component suggested by Klaassen & Jager 
(2011) has not yet been employed by any other authors despite its intuitive validity. In order to 
investigate the implication of the choice of interest rate component we hence construct three 
alternative EMP measures, which we call EMP2, EMP3 and EMP4. EMP2 simply removes the 
inflation adjustment and instead uses the level of nominal money market interest rate 
differential between the domestic country and the reference country (Germany). EMP3 instead 
includes the frequently used specification of the change in money market interest rate 
                                                             
40 See e.g. Eichengreen et al. (1995), Sachs et al. (1996) and Hegerty (2009 & 2010) 
41 Pontines & Siregar (2008) apply several techniques to evaluate different specifications but does not find 
any clear cut superiority of any single one of them. 
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differential while EMP4 uses the change in the real interest differential. We thus end up with 
three alternative EMP measures with different interest rate components specified as: 
 
              
            (7) 
 
               
            (8) 
 
               
            (9) 
 
Where       
   is the nominal money market interest rate differential and the other components 
are defined as before. 
4.2. Estimation 
Data 
The data used in the construction of our EMP series is obtained from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) over the period 1998-2010. In accordance with the conclusions of 
Klaassen & Jager (2011) we use the highest frequency possible which in our case is monthly 
data. However since monthly data of the monetary base is not available for the entire period for 
all countries we use M1 to deflate the IR component instead of the monetary base.42  
Results 
From our monthly exchange market pressure series (EMP1, EMP2, EMP3 and EMP4) 
provided in Figure 11 to Figure 13 a couple of things are worth commenting on. From the graphs 
we clearly see the turbulence experienced during the two periods of crisis. Interestingly we note 
that the magnitude of exchange rate pressure in Estonia and Lithuania was most pronounced 
during the Russian crisis years of 1998-2000, while Latvia experienced more turbulence during 
the 2008-2009 crisis. Regarding the specifications we see that the different EMP measures seem 
to be rather consistent over the greater part of the period. However we can note that our 
preferred specification (EMP1) starts to drift downwards in all countries around the time of EU 
accession in 2004, thus indicating appreciation pressure. This is due to the fact that the 
increasing inflation rate in the Baltics during this period was not off-set by proportional 
increases in monetary policy rates. Such a development makes the interest rate component in 
the EMP1 specification decrease, thus indicating appreciation pressure. This appreciation 
pressure makes intuitive sense despite growing current account deficits since we know that the 
Baltic countries experienced a surge in capital inflows. Since the EMP1 specification uses level 
interest rate differentials instead of first-differences the indicated appreciation pressure is 
persistent over time, which is not the case for EMP4 which uses change in the real interest rate 
differential instead. Some persistency can also be noted in the other level specification (EMP2) 
but without any particular trends.  
 
                                                             
42 This approach does not change the properties of our EMP series when we compare them to the series 
deflated by the monetary base over the periods with availability of data of both money aggregates. Using 
M1 instead of the monetary base is furthermore a frequently used approach see e.g. Klaassen & Jager 
(2011) or Hegerty (2009) 
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Figure 11 - EMP series Estonia 
 
Figure 12 – EMP series Latvia 
 
Figure 13 - EMP series Lithuania 
 
 
Table 1 to Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics of our EMP series and their 
components. Interestingly EMP1, EMP3 and EMP4 all indicate average appreciation pressure 
(negative means) while EMP2 instead indicate depreciation pressure. This finding suggests that 
using the level nominal interest rate might omit some important information. We also see that 
EMP1 in general seems to have somewhat less pronounced spikes as the difference between min 
and max values for it is smaller than the other series, especially compared with EMP3 and EMP4.  
Standard deviation of all EMP series seems to be very consistent between the series and the 
weights assigned to the different components are roughly in line, with much greater weight 
assigned to the reserve component. From the correlation matrices found in appendix 2 we see 
that EMP3 and EMP4 are the most associated series while EMP1 generally is least associated 
with the other series, although differences are small. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics EMP series Estonia 
 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 
Mean -0,0197 0,0283 -0,0071 -0,0051 
Median -0,0257 0,0192 -0,0057 -0,0096 
Max 0,1395 0,2117 0,2581 0,2299 
Min -0,2009 -0,1269 -0,2814 -0,2349 
Std Dev 0,0645 0,0628 0,0642 0,0648 
w1 0,0150 0,0171 0,0449 0,0369 
w2 0,9850 0,9829 0,9551 0,9631 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics EMP series Latvia 
 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 
Mean -0,0385 0,0094 -0,0083 -0,0079 
Median -0,0363 0,0007 -0,0081 -0,0110 
Max 0,2310 0,5096 0,3849 0,3908 
Min -0,3045 -0,2415 -0,6798 -0,6508 
Std Dev 0,0656 0,0675 0,0786 0,0790 
w1 0,0110 0,0226 0,0207 0,0195 
w2 0,9890 0,9774 0,9793 0,9805 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics EMP series Lithuania 
 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 
Mean -0,0350 0,0004 -0,0082 -0,0075 
Median -0,0266 -0,0097 -0,0035 -0,0019 
Max 0,1632 0,3144 0,1660 0,1701 
Min -0,3922 -0,2398 -0,3554 -0,2777 
Std Dev 0,0817 0,0789 0,0748 0,0758 
w1 0,0205 0,0371 0,0544 0,0470 
w2 0,9795 0,9629 0,9456 0,9530 
 
 
If we turn to graphically investigating the evolution of the international reserve and interest 
rate components individually, which can be found in appendix 2, we can confirm our 
observations that Estonia and Lithuania were under more stress during the Russian crisis than 
they were during the global financial crisis while the opposite is true for Latvia. The persistency 
of the level difference interest rate components can also be observed, especially for the real 
interest rate component used in EMP1. The volatility in the interest rate components during the 
periods in between the crises is relatively small. The changes in international reserves in 
contrast seem to fluctuate more symmetrically over time. This could reflect that direct 
intervention in the FX market has been the preferred tool of the Baltic central banks during 
normal times while periods of severe tension required further measures to be taken thus 
inducing them to use the more indirect policy tool of interest rate adjustment. 
  
By looking at the descriptive statistics of the individual components a few thing are worth 
mentioning. We see that the average nominal interest rate differential differ across countries 
being largest for Estonia followed by Latvia and then Lithuania. This could indicate a relatively 
larger independency of Estonian monetary policy or be caused by differing risk premiums 
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between countries. However these indications are naturally very weak and should not be used 
for any definite conclusions. From the max values of the nominal interest rate differentials we 
also see the relatively large response to the crisis in Latvia. 
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5. What scope for different policies? 
Before assessing the policy performance of the Baltic countries a couple of aspects should be 
taken into consideration. First, we must recognize that even though it is easy to identify much 
vulnerability with the advantage of hindsight, there was no anticipation of an external economic 
shock of the magnitude of the 2008-09 global financial crisis. Furthermore, as argued by Bakker 
& Gulde (2010), the risks were not entirely recognized or at least underestimated43, not only for 
the Baltics and the NMS but also globally. Economists disagreed on the risks associated with the 
imbalances that arose in the region during the boom years. It was noted that capital was flowing 
from rich to poor countries within Europe, but this was explained as income convergence and 
catching-up of credit-to-GDP levels, which was in accordance with economic theory.44 Others 
pointed out that current account deficits, external debt and credit growth were at 
unprecedented levels, not only compared to the countries historical levels but also compared to 
other emerging countries and that this was unsustainable. The differing opinions among 
economists made decision making more difficult and even though the risk of a crisis triggered by 
a shock was recognized, the event of such a severe shock was considered as a very unlikely event 
(Bakker & Gulde 2010). 
 
Secondly, with the background of underestimated risks and relatively prosperous future 
growth prospects, there was little incentive for domestic policy makers to build fiscal buffers. 
Darvas (2009b) actually argues that several economic advisors called for increased public 
investments in order to improve infrastructure. With these aspects in mind we now turn to the 
topic of policy evaluation in order to investigate if the devastating outcome of the crisis could 
have been reduced through more suitable policies. We will follow the principle framework laid 
out by Ostry et al. (2010) and assess the Baltic countries’ experience and possible policy options 
when attempting to deal with the surging capital inflows. We start by examining the 
macroeconomic concerns. 
5.1. Macroeconomic concerns 
Exchange rate policy 
The first consideration according to Ostry et al. (2010) is exchange rate policy or more 
specifically, to consider if the exchange rate should be allowed to appreciate in response to 
capital inflows? All three Baltic countries were operating fixed exchange rate regimes following 
their independence. Estonia initially pegged against the Deutsche Mark and later against the 
Euro while Lithuania and Latvia pegged against the US Dollar until 2002, then against the IMF 
SDR until 2004, and thereafter against the Euro. In June 2004 Estonia and Lithuania joined the 
ERMII and by April 2005 they were joined by Latvia (IMF CR 05-282). The standard fluctuation 
band within the ERMII is 15 percent but it is possible for individual countries to set a narrower 
band if desired. It should however be noted that in order to fulfil the Maastricht criteria a 
country must keep the much narrower fluctuation margin of 2.25 percent without any severe 
tension for at least two years prior to joining the EMU (Van Poeck et al. 2007). Estonia and 
Lithuania officially chose the wider band of 15 % when joining ERMII but according to Eurostat 
data the central parity has been maintained without virtually any fluctuation since it was set in 
2004. Latvia also officially joined the ERMII at a 15 % fluctuation band but in addition declared 
                                                             
43 See e.g. Riksrevisionen (2011) for a discussion. 
44 See e.g. Kiss-Marton & Vonnak (2006) or Egert et al. (2006) 
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that they unilaterally would maintain a narrower band of only 1 %. This central parity has been 
kept despite some rare adjustments within the narrow 1 % band which can only be assumed to 
have had negligible effects. Estonia and Lithuania operated formal currency boards meaning that 
the exchange rate regime and applicable exchange rate is set out in law, making it very credible 
and hard to abandon. Latvia on the other hand operated what is called a “quasi currency board” 
where long practice and public visibility makes it similarly credible (Bakker & Gulde 2010). 
According to the rules guarding their exchange rate mechanisms all three Baltic central banks 
ensure full backing for the currency in circulation by foreign reserves which further adds to their 
credibility.  
 
From our EMP estimations we have seen that the countries’ currencies were under some 
appreciation pressure due to the large capital inflows following EU accession. These flows were 
perceived to be part of a convergence process towards Western European levels and thus not 
that likely to come to be suddenly withdrawn. It might hence in retrospect appear as if some 
exchange rate realignment would have been a suitable strategy in response to the surging 
capital inflows. However it is important to keep in mind that the political path to Euro adoption 
set out early in the boom phase in combination with fear of widespread uncertainty if exchange 
rate realignment discussions were initiated, likely worked as heavy arguments in favour for 
keeping the central parities. Furthermore all three countries were running current account 
deficits of around 10 percent of GDP already by the time of EU accession, and these kept on 
deteriorating during the boom phase as did external competitiveness. Such developments would 
normally be considered reasons for devaluation. So to summarize we conclude that political 
ambitions, fear of losing confidence in the currency pegs and the conflict between the 
experienced appreciation pressure and the worsening external imbalances, likely made 
exchange rate adjustment an undesirable response to the surging capital inflows. 
Reserve accumulation and sterilization 
The next consideration to make is whether reserve accumulation is feasible, and if such 
accumulation should be sterilized. To assess whether the Baltic countries held an appropriate 
amount of international reserves it is important to put the level of reserves in relation to other 
variables of interest. We hence take a look at three different reserve ratios that have been 
suggested in the literature; the Greenspan-Guidotti rule of a reserves-to-STED ratio equal to one, 
the general result of Jeanne & Rancière suggesting a reserves-to-GDP ratio of 10 percent and the 
reserves-to-M2 ratio discussed in Obstfelt et al. (2008) for which do not have a suggested ratio. 
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 Starting with reserves-to-STED 
ration we see that Latvia and Lithuania 
have only held a ratio of around 0,4 over 
the period while Estonia started off at a 
ratio around one but this was severely 
reduced during the boom years. This 
indicates that the countries did not have 
enough foreign reserves to be able to 
cover a full year of external debt 
repayments without external financing. 
In accordance with the results of Rodrik 
& Velasco (1999) this indicates that all 
three countries should have accumulated 
more reserves in order to reduce the risk 
of experiencing a currency crisis. 
However, when looking at the reserves-
to-GDP ratio we see that this has 
increased over the period in all three 
countries, starting around the proposed 
10 percent at the end of the Russian crisis 
and rising to 15-20 percent in the run-up 
to the 2008-09 crisis. These ratios are 
clearly above those suggested and thus 
indicate that the Baltic reserve levels 
were very cautious. Finally when looking 
at the reserves-to-M2 ratio we see that 
there is some difference between the 
countries. In the run-up to the crisis 
Latvia held foreign reserves of 
approximately 40 percent of M2 while 
Estonia and Lithuania had 35 percent 
coverage. Remembering the Argentinean 
experience in 1995 where one-eighth of 
M2 was exchanged for central bank 
reserves over a rather short period of 
time, it still seems as if the Baltic reserve 
levels were adequate measured in 
relation to M2. With regard for the high 
credibility for the exchange rate regimes 
one cannot expect the Baltic central 
banks to have anticipated a currency run 
exceeding one-third of M2.  
 
After reviewing the different suggested measures of reserve adequacy there is one more 
thing to keep in mind before drawing any conclusions regarding the Baltic countries reserve 
adequacy, namely that they were all operating very rigid exchange rate regimes with full reserve 
backing of the currency in circulation. In such a setting maintaining the central parity is 
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naturally the first priority. However during appreciation pressure there is no conflict between 
exchange rate targeting and reserve accumulation, in fact in order to maintain  the peg there is 
likely a need for some reserve accumulation which was also the case in the Baltics as nominal 
reserves doubled in Lithuania, and increased three to four times in Estonia and Latvia during the 
2004-2008 period. That raises the question of sterilization. With the surging inflation rates in 
mind it seems as if sterilization was motivated. However, due to the complexity of sterilization 
operations45 we have not been able to perform any in-depth investigation of the extent of 
sterilization operations in the Baltic region. As mentioned in section 2.2 there are some 
limitations to sterilization which might have had impact on the extent of such operations 
performed in the Baltics. Both the direct cost of interest rate differential between foreign and 
domestic assets, and the fear of larger capital inflows following increasing domestic interest 
rates, could have posed obstacles to sterilization. Furthermore a large part of the increasing 
money supply came through private bank credit which left domestic authorities with little room 
for sterilization.  
Monetary and fiscal policy 
Due to their exchange rate regimes the Baltic countries lacked an independent monetary 
policy as control of interest rates was sacrificed in order to maintain their currency pegs. There 
was thus no scope for drastic interest rate increases in response to rising inflation and credit 
growth, thereby making real interest rates became very low or even negative as argued by 
Darvas (2009). The close alignment between the Baltic interest rates and the German (Euro) 
interest rate can also be seen in appendix 2 where the series of both nominal and real interest 
rate differentials can be found.  
 
Regarding fiscal policy Darvas (2009b) finds that the three countries differed in their policy 
approach. For Latvia he finds a clear pro-cyclical approach, while Lithuania acted only somewhat 
pro-cyclical and Estonia counter-cyclical over the period 2001-2007. Looking at the government 
balance of the three Baltic countries, which can be found in Figure 10, we see that Estonia ran 
positive balances throughout the years 2003-2007 and started to run deficits only as the crisis 
emerged. Latvia and Lithuania on the other hand were running deficits, although the deficits 
were relatively small and improved throughout the boom. However fiscal balances fail to 
capture the entire picture. As GDP expanded very fast, so did government revenue. This allowed 
the countries to increase public expenditure which added fuel to the boom in domestic demand. 
Furthermore rapid public sector wage increases particularly in Latvia, contributed to wage 
driven inflation. The rapid increase in nominal revenues and expenditures can be seen in Figure 
17. Bakker & Gulde (2010) point out that among the CEECs the countries with the sharpest 
increase in public expenditure were also showing more prominent signs of overheating. It hence 
seem as if more fiscal discipline would have been motivated out of concerns of overheating 
alone, but there would have been additional gains to be made from more prudent spending. The 
increasing revenues could have been used to build up fiscal buffers which could have been 
utilized to stimulate the economies during the downturn and to ward off illiquidity. This is 
particularly true for Latvia where a larger fraction of the banking sector was domestically owned 
and would hence relied on national sources of financing in times of stress.  
 
 
                                                             
45 See BIS (2009) for a comprehensive treatment of both market based and non-market sterilization 
operations. 
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So it seems as if there were many reasons why the Baltic countries should have tightened 
fiscal policy during the boom phase. It is however important to keep in mind that the countries 
were for a long time looked upon as growth miracles and GDP growth was expected to continue, 
although somewhat slower, in IMF forecasts made in 2007 for the 2008-2012 period. The large 
capital inflows were perceived to be in line with economic theory as capital flowed from richer 
to poorer countries. Even the extreme credit expansion was by some estimates only reflecting a 
catch-up to Western European levels (Darvas 2009b, Bakker-Gulde 2010). Furthermore all three 
countries had very small levels of government debt in comparison with Western European 
countries (see Figure 18), which likely reduced worries over fiscal spending. Despite these facts 
we note that some of the risks were acknowledged, and with the very large imbalances and 
rapidly expanding domestic demand there should have been a realization of the need for fiscal 
tightening, especially in Latvia. 
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5.2. Financial stability concerns 
The work of assessing Baltic financial regulation is a very complex task given our limited 
knowledge of their respective domestic regulation. This work is further complicated by the fact 
that all countries have made substantial changes following the crisis and that archives of older 
regulation documents only are available in national languages. Furthermore, it is a very hard 
task to establish the sphere of responsibilities regarding the supervision of local subsidiaries 
and branches of foreign parent banks.46 In short subsidiaries are regulated by domestic 
authorities while branches answer to home country regulation. For these reasons we will not be 
able to give any detailed assessments of the policies performed. Instead we focus on the 
observable development and discuss what policies that could have been used in order to meet 
such a development. We find some indication of the policies performed in a paper by Hilbers 
(2005), who examine prudential policy responses to the credit expansion for the CEECs up until 
2004-05. Unfortunately we have not been able to find any similar reviews covering later time 
periods. Since discriminatory prudential policies and capital controls are prohibited by EU 
legislation we will not take such measures into consideration. 
Credit growth and housing bubbles 
There were several concerns of financial instability present during the Baltic boom. One of 
them was the rapidly inflating house price bubble mainly caused by expanding mortgage lending 
and high future income expectations. Such worries according to Ostry et al. (2011), call for 
prudential policies or broad based capital controls. Imposing credit ceilings or raising capital 
requirements could potentially have had some effect in the Baltics, but could also induce foreign 
banks to serve their prime customers directly through branches, thus circumventing the 
regulations, leaving domestic credit institutions and subsidiaries with a worse set of clients. This 
scenario had previously been observed in Bulgaria where credit growth continued even after the 
introduction of credit ceilings (Bakker & Gulde 2010). The Estonian and Latvian authorities of 
financial supervision reached out to their counterparts in parent banks’ home countries in 2005, 
in an attempt to convince them to help reduce credit growth in the Baltics. However these 
attempts were met with little sympathy as the parent banks’ risk management was perceived to 
be satisfactory on a banking group level. Furthermore there was doubt of whether measures 
directly targeting parent banks’ Baltic operations might be in conflict with EU regulation 
(Riksrevisionen 2011). 
  
Hence it seems as the scope for supply-side prudential policies was rather limited, which 
brings us to demand side prudential policies. Given the Baltic macroeconomic development it 
seems as if stricter regulation in order to decrease demand for credit would have been feasible. 
This could have been done for example by imposing strict Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratios, especially 
on mortgages, or by policies aimed at reducing incentives to take on loans, such as reducing tax-
deductibility of interest rate payments. Another policy option could have been to adopt stricter 
bank specific regulation based on bank soundness. However, estimations of bank risks were 
performed by both parent bank supervisors and international institutions such as the IMF47 with 
the general conclusion that both domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries supported by parent 
banks were not suffering from any obvious unsoundness (IMF CR 06/414, Riksrevisionen 2011).  
                                                             
46 See IMF (2007) for a comprehensive overview of the complexity and uncertainty regarding the 
responsibility sharing in the supervision of financial institutions. 
47 See e.g. Tamirisa & Igan (2008) who did not find that bank soundness had deteriorated substantially but 
did encourage close future monitoring. 
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With this fact in mind it is hard to see that the Baltic supervisory authorities could have done 
any different judgements. 
FX exposure 
Rapid expansions of FX denominated debt and increasing exposure to currency risk had 
been seen before in connection to the Latin-American and Asian crises. However the risks 
associated was principally considered less worrying in the Baltic region, since much of the 
exposure was assumed to be protected by solvent parent banks (Riksrevisionen 2011). Since 
most lending to ultimate borrowers was denominated in foreign currency there was no big 
concern of open FX positions of credit institutions. This currency risk was instead concentrated 
to ultimate borrowers who typically do not appreciate the risks that arise from having 
mismatches in income and liabilities. The currency composition of lending to residents can be 
seen in Figure 24. We clearly see how the share of Euro denominated loans increased in Latvia 
and Lithuania following EU accession and ERMII entry. In Estonia about 75 percent of loans 
were already being issued in Euros by 2004. As an increasing share of the private sectors debt is 
in foreign currency policymakers’ options in response to growing external imbalances and 
decreasing competitiveness becomes very limited. We have seen that there were large 
imbalances with plummeting current accounts and real appreciations in all Baltic countries but 
devaluation was not a feasible option because it would likely have triggered a severe recession 
and also likely caused massive losses to the banking sector as borrowers would not be able to 
service their debts. Plausible policy measures in response to such a situation involve limits or 
outright prohibition of FX lending or increased capital requirements on FX loans. Such 
regulation would likely have shifted the currency risk from ultimate borrowers to credit 
institutions who likely would have been more capable of realizing the risks and more able to 
acquire proper hedging. But timing of such measures would have been of crucial importance 
since it would likely have reduced confidence in the exchange rate pegs. 
 
By the time of EU accession in 2004, competitiveness had not yet deteriorated much (see 
Figure 27) and despite large current account deficits, external imbalances were not a main 
concern. As a result, there was probably little incentive at that point to implement restrictions 
on FX borrowing, especially with regards to negative signals regarding Euro adoption this might 
have sent. The signalling effect likely became even more important as external imbalance grew 
and FX debt became even larger, thereby increasing uncertainty. The large speculative pressure 
on the Lats during the crisis do, at least to some extent, give some indication of what might have 
happened if confidence in the pegs had been lost. It therefore seems as if restrictions an FX 
lending would have required very early implementation, probably simultaneously with the 
financial market liberalizations following independence.  
Liability structure and maturity mismatches 
From Figure 19 we see the maturity composition of the Baltic countries external debt and in 
Figure 20 we see short-term external debt as a share of GDP reaching as much as 35-55 percent 
in the Baltic countries by 2007. We further know that a large part of foreign capital inflows was 
used to finance mortgage credits which are long-term assets. Such a development is clearly 
dangerous in the event of a liquidity squeeze, as experienced during the global financial crisis, 
since debt repayments might be hard to roll over.  
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Figure 20 - STED to GDP ratio, Source: IFS, QEDS 
 
There are several potential policy measures to address concerns of maturity mismatches 
outlined by Ostry et al. (2011) but many of them involve discriminatory measures which were 
not available to the Baltic countries. That leaves us with general prudential policies such as 
higher liquidity requirements, but as with all financial regulation these do not apply to branches 
of foreign banks and thus risks being circumvented. 
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Figure 19 - Maturity structure of external debt, Source: QEDS 
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6. Conclusions 
It has become apparent from the many currency and financial crises observed during the last 
couple of decades that large capital inflows truly are a mixed blessing. After initially being on a 
very prosperously looking path of rapid convergence towards Western Europe, the Baltic 
countries eventually found themselves in a situation with little maneuverability to cool down 
their overheating economies. As the unanticipated global financial crisis struck with a largely 
unforeseen scale, the fragile Baltic economies took severe damage, although due to rapid 
responses of neighboring authorities and international organizations a full blown currency and 
banking crisis was avoided. 
  
In retrospect it seems as if all three Baltic countries might have been too hasty in their 
ambition to become fully integrated in the EU. They all started off as very underdeveloped 
economies and in relatively short time imposed strict limitations to their monetary policy 
independence. It might have been better to allow for more flexibility initially in order to allow 
for their economies to adjust. Furthermore, they had little time to develop well functioning 
institutions which likely affected their supervisory authorities’ ability to assess risks in the 
financial sector as well as their governments’ fiscal discipline. Since the EU do not allow for 
restrictions to capital movements the only scope for different policies lies within these two 
policy areas. Regarding fiscal policy we have found that despite the relatively well looking fiscal 
balances were hiding very rapidly increasing expenditures which likely contributed to the 
eventually uncontrollable boom. Even though it is desirable to make sure that the benefits from 
increasing national income is distributed widely, it is equally important to plan for gloomier 
days to come. As we have seen capital flows, especially of short-term nature, can be very volatile 
and reliance on the persistency of such is associated with many dangers. There is hence a need 
to carefully monitor their impact on both financial risks and macroeconomic stability, and take 
appropriate action in order to meet such concerns. 
 
In the Baltics areas of particular concern were the massive balance-sheet exposure of the 
private sector to currency risk and property prices, which effectively prevented the countries 
from exchange rate realignment. Furthermore the relatively large domestic financial sector in 
Latvia made the country particularly vulnerable to a liquidity squeeze as there were no foreign 
parent banks to rely on for financing during the crisis. This left the country very vulnerable to 
speculative pressure as concerns regarding government solvency arose, despite relatively low 
levels of public debt.  
 
Measuring exchange rate pressure is an important area in order to gain knowledge of 
different exchange rate regimes. As have been shown in this study there is no wide consensus on 
the appropriate way of doing this. We have found that the approach suggested by Klaassen & 
Jager (2011) seems to provide some additional information and we argue that it is more 
intuitive than other approaches. Although our study also shows that the differences between 
alternative approaches is rather small. In addition, we have only been able to briefly examine the 
area, and there is plenty of scope for future research regarding the performance of different 
constructions and applications of the EMP index. 
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Appendix 1 – The boom-bust cycle illustrated 
Following EU accession large levels of capital flowed into the Baltic economies 
 
  
 
A large part of the flows were directed to the financial sector which rapidly expanded 
credit to the private sector… 
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…mainly through FX denominated loans… 
 
 
 
…of which a large part went to mortgages. 
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Easy access to credit and rising income boosted domestic demand…  
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…fuelling inflation and creating large external imbalances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The eventual bust caused substantial damage to the Baltic economies. 
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Appendix 2 – Evolution of EMP components and descriptive statistics of EMP series 
 
 
Figure 30 - IR component Estonia 
 
 
Figure 31 - Interest series Estonia (diff series right scale) 
 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics EMP components Estonia 
 r-r* i-i* Δi-i* Δr-r* ΔIR 
Mean -1,0552 1,9531 -0,0768 -0,0413 0,0039 
Median -1,8422 0,8915 -0,0100 -0,0204 0,0012 
Max 8,9718 13,7300 3,0700 3,7018 0,1366 
Min -6,6501 -0,6800 -6,3500 -5,6511 -0,1611 
Std Dev 2,9758 2,6161 0,9655 1,1838 0,0454 
 
Table 5 - Correlation Matrix EMP series Estonia 
 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 
EMP1 1,0000    
EMP2 0,8078 1,0000   
EMP3 0,5526 0,5647 1,0000  
EMP4 0,6227 0,6492 0,9050 1,0000 
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Figure 32 - IR component Latvia 
 
 
Figure 33 - Interest series Latvia (diff series right scale) 
 
 
Table 6 - Descriptive statistics EMP components Latvia 
 r-r* i-i* Δi-i* Δr-r* ΔIR 
Mean -2,7505 0,7774 -0,0077 0,0139 0,0084 
Median -2,2098 0,5500 -0,0100 0,0000 0,0059 
Max 17,6510 20,9300 16,8500 18,2205 0,3010 
Min -15,8700 -2,1000 -18,6000 -18,2711 -0,2281 
Std Dev 4,4070 2,1215 2,3238 2,4744 0,0491 
 
Table 7 - Correlation Matrix EMP series Latvia 
 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 
EMP1 1,0000    
EMP2 0,7020 1,0000   
EMP3 0,6777 0,8134 1,0000  
EMP4 0,6935 0,8150 0,9804 1,0000 
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Figure 34 - IR component Lithuania 
 
 
Figure 35 - Interest series Lithuania (diff series right scale) 
 
 
Table 8 - Descriptive statistics EMP components Lithuania 
 r-r* i-i* Δi-i* Δr-r* ΔIR 
Mean -1,3351 0,2279 -0,0150 -0,0009 0,0079 
Median -1,1319 -0,1000 0,0200 0,0000 0,0082 
Max 5,3556 9,0300 3,4200 3,9213 0,3879 
Min -9,3844 -2,6600 -4,3400 -5,3556 -0,1667 
Std Dev 2,9006 1,5753 1,0537 1,2301 0,0606 
 
Table 9 - Correlation Matrix EMP series Lithuania 
 EMP1 EMP2 EMP3 EMP4 
EMP1 1,0000    
EMP2 0,5462 1,0000   
EMP3 0,5262 0,6206 1,0000  
EMP4 0,5644 0,5326 0,7550 1,0000 
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Appendix 3. EMP Data 
 
Variable Definition Source 
EMP1               
         
  
Authors’ calculations 
EMP2               
         
 
Authors’ calculations 
EMP3                
         
 
Authors’ calculations 
EMP4                
         
 
Authors’ calculations 
      
   
 
       
  
 
 
      
   
 
    
   
 
   
 
    
 
         
       
 
 
where σ is the standard deviations of each 
series respectively. 
Authors’ calculations 
IR Change (from last period) in net 
international reserves, denominated by M1 
Net reserves: IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) line 1L (total 
reserves minus gold) minus line 2EGS 
(Use of fund credit) 
M1: IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) line 14/59MA 
 
      
   Short-term real interest rate differential 
where rt is the domestic money market 
rate and r*t is the German money market 
rate plus the CPI based yearly inflation 
differential. Money market rates are period 
averages. 
Money market rates: International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) line 60B 
Inflation: International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) line 64 
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Appendix 4 – Selected vulnerability indicators 2004 and 2009 
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Figure 36 - Selected vulnerability indicators 2004, Sources: Eurostat, IFS 
Figure 37 - Selected vulnerability indicators 2009, Sources: Eurostat, IFS 
